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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THREE EMPIRICAL ESSAYS ON STARTUPS’ SURVIVAL USING THE KAUFFMAN 
FIRM SURVEY 
by 
Mohamad Nassereddine 
Florida International University, 2012 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Peter Thompson, Major Professor 
This dissertation studies newly founded U.S. firms’ survival using three different releases 
of the Kauffman Firm Survey. I study firms’ survival from a different perspective in each chapter. 
The first essay studies firms’ survival through an analysis of their initial state at startup 
and the current state of the firms as they gain maturity. The probability of survival is determined 
using three probit models, using both firm-specific variables and an industry scale variable to 
control for the environment of operation. The firm’s specific variables include size, experience 
and leverage as a debt-to-value ratio. The results indicate that size and relevant experience are 
both positive predictors for the initial and current states. Debt appears to be a predictor of exit if 
not justified wisely by acquiring assets. As suggested previously in the literature, entering a 
smaller-scale industry is a positive predictor of survival from birth. Finally, a smaller-scale 
industry diminishes the negative effects of debt.  
The second essay makes use of a hazard model to confirm that new service-providing 
(SP) firms are more likely to survive than new product providers (PPs). I investigate the possible 
explanations for the higher survival rate of SPs using a Cox proportional hazard model. I examine 
six hypotheses (variations in capital per worker, expenses per worker, owners’ experience, 
industry wages, assets and size), none of which appear to explain why SPs are more likely than 
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PPs to survive. Two other possibilities are discussed: tax evasion and human/social relations, but 
these could not be tested due to lack of data. 
The third essay investigates women-owned firms’ higher failure rates using a Cox 
proportional hazard on two models. I make use of a never-before used variable that proxies for 
owners’ confidence. This variable represents the owners’ self-evaluated competitive advantage. 
The first empirical model allows me to compare women’s and men’s hazard rates for 
each variable. In the second model I successively add the variables that could potentially explain 
why women have a higher failure rate. Unfortunately, I am not able to fully explain the gender 
effect on the firms’ survival. Nonetheless, the second empirical approach allows me to confirm 
that social and psychological differences among genders are important in explaining the higher 
likelihood to fail in women-owned firms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Economic sustainability and growth rely heavily on individuals’ ability and desire to 
become entrepreneurs. According to the Small Business Administration (SBA), small businesses 
comprise 99.7 percent of all employer firms in the U.S. economy. Needless to say, policies 
designed to accommodate entrepreneurship and small businesses creation are necessary in order 
to get the economy out of a recession and motivate job creation. Recently, President Obama 
unveiled an economic plan to reduce unemployment by motivating job creation in the private 
sector.  
However, the recent economic downturn has pushed many companies out of business and 
firms’ survival studies are now needed more than ever to comprehend what factors contribute to 
firms’ survival in order to give small businesses a chance to remain in business and create jobs.  
The recent release of the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), a longitudinal dataset that 
follows newly founded firms on a yearly basis, provided an opportunity to review previous 
findings and contribute to the literature with new findings. This entire dissertation makes use of 
the KFS to investigate three questions related to firm survival. 
The first essay analyzes the effects of a firm’s current and founding conditions on its 
survival. Prior to this research, studies such as Audretsch and Mahmood (1994) and Åstebro and 
Bernhardt (2003) have reported evidence of the non-negligible effects of founding conditions on 
a firm’s survival ability.  
This motivates the question of why there is a lack of studies comparing current to 
founding conditions’ effects on firms’ survival. To the best of my knowledge this question has yet 
to be addressed. Moreover, previous studies lacked adequate data. For example, Åstebro and 
Bernhardt (2003) used the “Characteristics of Business Owners”, which imposes a five-year gap 
on the data waves. Other studies restricted their analysis to specific industries. The release of the 
KFS allows me to remediate these data issues.  
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I attempt to answer the question stated above through an empirical approach. Thus, using 
probit models, I investigate the effects of variables in the literature that have been found to affect 
firms’ survival. On the one hand, the effects of current conditions are estimated using the 
probability of survival at time t using the independent variables measure attt 1− . On the other 
hand, the founding conditions effects represent the probability of survival at time t using the 
variable measure att 0 .  
The literature has previously documented unambiguous positive effects of size (Geroski, 
Mata and Portugal 2010; Mata and Portugal 1994) and experience (Thompson 2005; Klepper and 
Simons 2003) on survival. I follow the literature and control for these variables as well. 
Additionally, Audretsch and Mahmood (1994) confirm the importance of industry measures to 
control for the environment of the firm. Thus, an industry dummy allows me to control for the 
scale of operation within the industry that a firm operates in. Last, I add financial leverage 
dummies to the model. Firms’ debt over assets ratio is calculated and attached to a corresponding 
dummy measure (0, lower than 1, 1, greater than 1 and infinite). Previously, studies such as 
Cooley and Quadrini (2001) claimed that debt was a determinant of failure. Åstebro and 
Bernhardt (2003), however, claim that survival probability was increasing with external initial 
debt. 
 The first chapter results allow me to reiterate the importance of size and experience on 
firms’ survival. Moreover, I find that the effects of size are greater in the current conditions, 
while the effects of experience are more important at foundation. Also, leverage seems to 
decrease the firms’ survival prospects when the debt is not used to acquire assets. These results 
on leverage hold true both in the current and founding conditions. Finally, the industry scale 
measure seems to matter at entrance only (foundation). Firms entering a smaller-scale industry 
are more likely to survive. 
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The second essay examines which side of the product-service spectrum is most likely to 
contribute to firms’ survival. That is, firms need to make the decision at startup to be a service 
provider(s) (SP), a product provider(s) (PP) or a provider of both services and products (PB). I am 
not aware of any study in the literature that tackles firms’ survival from this perspective. This 
essay was motivated by the hole found in the literature and thus represents an attempt to better 
understand which factors motivate firms’ survival. 
The survival analysis is conducted using a Cox proportional hazard model. The first goal 
of the paper is to provide proof that one side of the product-service spectrum is indeed more 
likely to survive than the other. I focus the study on SPs and PPs. The firms were part of the KFS 
in which firms respondents were asked if they provide services, products or both. Thus, each firm 
was associated with a dummy variable. The results indicate that SPs were associated with lower 
failure. In a continuing endeavor, I test six hypotheses (which could explain the hazard rate 
behavior). The survival associated with being an SP or a PP is tested using these hypotheses first 
individually and then by successively adding them. The hypotheses (capital per worker, expenses 
per worker, owners’ experience, size, assets and industry wage) are stated using the variables on 
which SPs and PPs differ the most, together with the literature on firms’ survival.  
The study provides insights on factors that could promote PPs’ and SPs’ survival. For 
instance, I find that capital per worker is the most important contributor to PPs’ survival ability. I 
also find that an increase in assets increases PPs’ failure rates once size is controlled for. 
Unfortunately, I am not able to explain empirically the reasons behind PPs’ higher failure rates. 
Thus, I suggest that SPs’ higher ability to evade taxes and customers’ retention ability should be 
the next hypotheses to be tested. 
The third essay contributes to the owners’ gender firms’ survival literature. There are 
disagreements among researchers on whether women-owned firms are more likely to fail. On the 
one hand, a majority of the research (Boden and Nucci 2000; Carter, Williams and Reynolds 
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1997) confirms that women-owned firms are associated with higher failure rates. On the other 
hand, papers such as Kalleberg and Leicht (1991), found no negative effects of gender on 
survival.  
An overwhelming number of studies have tried to explain the gender effect on survival 
through variables on which women-and men-owned companies differ greatly. The variables 
mostly represented human capital measures, industry of operation, firm’s size and financial 
capital structure. However, evidence suggests that differences across genders exist as well at 
social and psychological level.  
The KFS provides two variables that could be used as proxies for social and 
psychological measures. The first one is home-operated businesses. Women tend to be more 
likely to operate their businesses from home, and Boden and Nucci (2000) reported that 
businesses operating from home use less financial capital at startup. Furthermore, Boden and 
Nucci found that startup financial capital was positively linked to business survival. Owners’ 
were asked by the Kauffman Foundation if they believed they had a competitive advantage. Thus, 
I use this self-reported judgment variable as a proxy of owners’ confidence.  
I use the home-operated dummy and the competitive advantage dummy, along with other 
measures found in the literature (size, experience, debt and equity), within two survival models 
with Cox specifications. The first model is used on both women- and men-owned firms’ 
subsamples. I find that women have better coefficients for survival on most variables, indicating 
that the gender effect on firms’ survival is most probably the result of differences within these 
variables. For instance, women may benefit from a greater effect on survival from hiring a 
marginal employee, but men have more employees. Competitive advantage, however, seem to be 
more beneficial to men. After confirming that women-owned companies within the KFS were 
more likely to fail, I pursue my investigation and add the variables successively with the 
corresponding gender’s interaction variables. Although I was not able to completely explain the 
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gender effect on firms’ survival, the last model—which adds the competitive advantage 
dummy—indicates that psychological differences among genders are an important factor in 
explaining women-owned firms’ higher failure rates. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Startups Survival Analysis using the Kauffman Firm Survey: An Analysis of Founding and 
Current Conditions on Survival. 
1.1 Introduction 
This paper reports the results of a study of the effects of current and founding conditions 
on firm survival using the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS). We know from prior work that a firm’s 
founding conditions have persistent effects on its survival and growth (Mata and Portugal 1994, 
Mata et al. 1995, Audretsch and Mahmood 1994, Carroll et al. 1996, Åstebro and Bernhardt 
2003, Huynh et al. 2008, Geroski et al. 2010), but data limitations have left us with many 
unanswered questions. 
Empirical research on survival or growth requires a dataset with three characteristics: a 
large sample containing a large range of sizes, firms that are followed from birth and short 
intervals between follow ups. Before the KFS, research on firm dynamics were conducted on 
databases each lacking one or more of the needed characteristics. For example, Åstebro and 
Bernhardt (2003) use a sample of firms taken from the “Characteristics of Business Owners” 
(CBO), a survey published by the US Census in 1982, 1987 and 1992. The study was conducted 
on a sample from the survey of new firms created in 1987 and the sample is checked again in 
1992, a five year gap, to determine who survived. A five-year gap is a large gap in time, enough 
to suggest that their results could be improved. Some of the firms found dead in 1992 could have 
died in 1988 or later. 
The Kauffman Firm Survey is a new panel dataset on firms created in 2004, and firms are 
followed consistently every year. The KFS has all the needed characteristics and presents a 
bonus. It surveys a large range of industries. This paper contributes to the literature by filling 
some of the gaps brought about by the lack of data availability regarding the different firm and 
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industry specific variables. I use the KFS to check on the reliability of past research conducted in 
the literature by studying the current state effects on survival together with the initial state.  
Growth and survival analyses have been relatively well covered in the literature on firm 
dynamics. Both areas share common variables such as size 1 , experience and owners’ 
characteristics just to cite a few. Gibrat’s Law2 states that a firm’s growth rate is independent of 
its size. Past studies have provided empirical evidence suggesting that Gibrat’s Law could be 
wrong or at least wrong to some extent (Kumar 1985, Evans 1987, Hall 1987). Hall (1987) rejects 
Gibrat’s law for small firms although she accepts the law for larger firms. Evans (1987) shows 
that the growth rate and its variance are negatively correlated with a firm’s size and age. Evans 
also reported that survival was increasing with age, a result found in other studies (Dunne et al. 
1989). Evans reinforced Hall, confirming that Gibrat’s Law was indeed holding for larger firms. 
Dunne et al. (1989) conducted their study on the growth and failure of manufacturing plants. 
Their results suggested that failure rates decline with plant size and age.  
Few models have been developed to explain these age effects. Among them, Cooley and 
Quadrini (2001) is notable. Cooley and Quadrini (2001) added a theoretical model of size (equity) 
and age effects on firm’s dynamics, providing a significant contribution to the firm’s dynamics 
literature. They differentiate their contribution from previous research by taking both size and age 
dependency into consideration simultaneously, after introducing financial frictions into the 
model. Cooley and Quadrini claim that debt matters and is a cause of failure. The model depicted 
by Cooley and Quadrini predicts that younger firms tend to take on more debt which in turn 
increases the volatility of their profits, thus increasing their failure rate.  
                                                            
1 The empirical literature has been more developed on the subject with papers such as Dunne et al.  (1989); 
Mitchell (1994), Audretsch and Mahmood (1994), Haveman (1995), Geroski et al.  (2010) Huynh et al. 
(2008). Theoretically, on the other hand, size effects on growth and survival is harder to find. Jonavovic 
(1982), a reference, assumes that initial size does not matter and current size includes all the information  
on the firm history allowing survival or exit. This is contrary to some of the empirical findings cited above 
reporting the importance of initial size for survival. 
  
2 See Sutton (1997). 
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Although the age hypothesis cannot be tested directly using the KFS (all firms are part of 
the same cohort together with the KFS being a relatively new dataset), it is tested for indirectly 
through the debt hypothesis. Financial conditions (debt, equity and leverage) have also been a 
critical part of firms’ dynamics in the literature and the KFS offers a full range of data available at 
every life stage of the financial health of the company. Cooley and Quadrini also found that 
leverage (described as debt over equity) was decreasing with firm’s size because smaller firms 
take on more debt. Relating these findings to the size and survival literature (probability of exit 
decreases with size), I can assume that the probability of exit should be decreasing with leverage.  
Åstebro and Bernhardt (2003) studied the initial financing conditions of the firm effects on 
survival. They argue that probability of survival is increasing with initial external debt, although a 
negative correlation exists between initial bank loans and survival.  On the other hand, Huynh et 
al. (2008) suggest that a firm’s exit probability is increasing with leverage3.  
I test for the effects of quality using years of experience in the industry, as suggested by 
Thompson (2005). A literature promoting experience as an important contributor to survival has 
been developed. Research has tackled two main areas pertaining to firms’ experience. First, past 
studies 4  find the effects on owners’ pre-entry experience to be a persistent determinant of 
performance in the years following entry. Second, the more related the experience is to the 
industry in which the firm operates the more valuable it is. Thompson studies both effects in the 
shipbuilding industry and his findings reinforce Klepper and Simons’ (2000) suggestion that 
firms with more experience in related fields of the industry perform better than de novo entrants 
with less experience. 
                                                            
3  Huynh et al. (2008) describe leverage as debt over assets. Exit is increasing with the leverage variable 
and therefore with debt value relative to asset value (leverage= debt /assets). This is the definition I use in 
the paper. This confirms the results found by Cooley and Quadrini (2001). 
 
4  Carroll et al. (1996), Jovanovic  and Rousseau (2001). 
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Firm-specific characteristics are not the only major predictors of survival and growth. 
The environment in which the firm operates is also significant. Audretsch (1991), and Audretsch 
and Mahmood (1994) emphasize the need to consider the industry together with firm 
characteristics. I introduce a dummy representing the scale of the industry in which the firm 
operates.  The minimum efficient scale (MES) specific to an industry could be an important 
determinant of survival. Growth constraints indicate that the higher the scale of the industry the 
more difficult it is for firms to reach the MES.  
I make use of probit regressions, which allows me to estimate the effects of current and 
initial conditions on the firm’s survival in the following period for every year the firm stays alive. 
The current conditions’ effects on survival are estimated, letting me determine how the state of 
the company during a year affects its survival next year. The initial state effects are obtained the 
same way but only regressing on founding conditions variables. On one hand, the study finds that 
size is a more important positive predictor of survival in the current condition although I do find 
the founding conditions to be a significant positive predictor of survival as well. On the other 
hand, the relevance of owners experience is a more important positive predictor of survival in the 
founding stage. Current relevant owners’ experience is also found to be a positive contributor to 
survival. Both stages associate diminishing returns to relevance of owners’ experience.  
 The probability of survival seems to be decreasing with leverage. The companies that 
have negative equity seem to be the most prone to exit. Evidently, a firm needs to use the debt it 
owes adequately or debt will drive the firm to exit. Entering a lower scale industry seems to 
increase the probability of survival and the results are significant in the first year and in the years 
following entrance. It is the choice of entrance into an industry that is significant as opposed to 
the yearly activity in a low scale industry. Moreover, entrance in a low scale industry decreases 
the negative effect of debt. 
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The first section of the paper describes the Kauffman Firm Survey and provides summary 
statistics on the full dataset. The second section introduces the variables used, in addition to 
providing a description of three different models. A brief literature review accompanies the model 
descriptions. The third section presents the results in two parts. The first part analyses the current 
year condition on survival and the second part adds the effects on survival of initial condition. 
Finally, I conclude the paper with a summary of the findings and a discussion for future research 
possibilities. 
1.2 The Kauffman Firm Survey 
I use the public release of the KFS, a panel data set covering a broad range of topics, 
allowing the study of a sample of firms created in 2004. The dataset contains information on a 
variety of topics including financing, organizational structure and legal status, business 
characteristics and strategy, owners demographics and work behavior. 
The KFS is based on a random sample of businesses--from the Dun and Bradstreet (DB) 
database—created in 2004. The questionnaires sent to the sample were designed by the 
Mathematica Policy Research. The baseline questionnaire was sent in 2004 and due to the quest 
for a longitudinal database, follow-up questionnaires were sent every following year. So far 
adding to the baseline are three following waves consisting of 2005, 2006 and 2007 data.  
`The development and change aspects involved with innovations in high-tech industries 
motivated the Foundation to oversample firms in these fields. The screening/eligibility test 
allowed only 15 percent of the potential pool of firms to be part of the sample. The initial sample 
of firms passed “the eligibility test” defining a new business in 2004 and consisted of 4,928 firms 
out of an initial pool of 32,429 businesses. Respondents were paid $50 to answer using a self-
administered web survey or a computer-assisted telephone interview.  
Eligibility was determined with two tests. A firm had to be a new company and it had to 
be a company created individually by de novo entrepreneurs. The first test ensures that the 
12 
 
company had started its activity in 2004. Therefore, if the firm had started activity in 2003 (or 
earlier) under any other form of structure and the 2004 initial year of activity for example only 
marked a restructuring (e.g., sold business, renamed business, or change in activity), the firm did 
not qualify to be part of the sample. The second test checked ownership and provenance of the 
firm. It could not be a subsidiary of any other business, could not have been a spin off, nor 
inherited by previous owners. Finally, it could not be a not-for-profit company. Firms that passed 
both tests were part of the sample in the baseline questionnaire and follow ups. The baseline 
questionnaire records data at the birth of the firm, and therefore is used as the initial conditions of 
operation in the study. 
As previously stated, there are four waves available in the current Kauffman Firm 
Survey. Firms that participated in the first wave satisfied two conditions. They first needed to be 
part of the baseline sample, and needed to have survived the first year of activity. The first wave 
found that 7.4 percent (6 percent plus 1.4 percent) of the 4,928 (369) were out of business by the 
end of 2005 (see Table 1.1). There were 4,523 businesses left in 2005. More businesses were 
found have closed by the time of the second and third follow ups. Some of the surviving firms 
chose not to answer and sample weights were adjusted accordingly. 
The possible reasons for exit were determined at the beginning of the survey. Firms that 
ceased operation temporarily were a small minority in the sample. In the first year 3 percent of 
the sample temporarily ceased operation, 3.1 percent in the second and 1.7 percent in the third 
year. I exclude those firms from the study because the survey extends four years. A firm 
described as active in any year had to have been described as active in all previous years. A firm 
that ceased operation temporarily (for example one that exits in 2005 and is seen as reappearing 
in 2007) is dropped from the sample (36 observations were dropped). 
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Any reason that will bring the respondents to declare that the same original business is no 
longer in operation, with at least one of the original founders is defined as inactive in my study5. 
Hence, businesses that were sold or that merged with other businesses were also described as 
closed because of the change in ownership. Only 1.4 percent of the businesses were sold or 
merged the first year, compared with 1.3 percent and 0.8 percent respectively in the second and 
third years. 
Table 1.1 
Firms’ Outcomes (2004-2007)6 in Percentages 
 
Year 2005 2006 2007 
Survived  89.6 80.2 73.4 
Closed operations 6.0 14.0 21.4 
Sold to or merged with another business 1.4 2.7 3.5 
Temporarily ceased operations or other 3.0 3.1 1.7 
 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey Microdata. Sample includes only surviving firms over the 2004-2007 
period, and firms that have been verified as going out of business over the same period. The original 
sample size in 2004 was 4,928. 
 
Some firms were reported to have no owner in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007, and were 
dropped from the sample (respectively, 41, 22, 23 and 16 observations were deleted). Some firms 
surveyed could also be firms created to reduce taxes on an individual. It has been shown in prior  
research, both theoretical and empirical (Gordon 1998, Åstebro and Bernhadt 2003), that paying 
fewer taxes could be an incentive for individuals to create companies as a tax shelter because 
corporate tax rules are often advantageous compared to income tax. Hence, I expect some of the 
firms surveyed were also created as tax shelters. The way I chose to correct for this issue was to 
drop the firms that reported no sales in all years of activity (58 observations were deleted). 
                                                            
5 Hall (1987) considers mergers as the exit of two firms and the creation of a new firm. The creation of a 
new firm is irrelevant in my study.  
 
6 From A. Robb et al. “An overview of the Kauffman Firm Survey”, Results from the 2004-2007 Data”, 
2009 
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Table 1.2 
Firms’ Distribution by Industry7 in Percentages 
 
Industry names and (code) 
KFS New 
Employer 
Businesses 
Census 
Employer 
Firm 
Births 
PSED 
New 
Businesses
Professional (54), 15.5 14.1 16.1 
 Management, and Educational Services (61) 
Retail  Trade (44) 15.6 12 18.6 
Administrative and Support, and Waste  11.4 6 2.1 
Management and Remediation Services (56) 
Construction (23) 9.8 15.7 10 
Other Services (except Public Administration) (81) 8 8.5 0.3 
Manufacturing (31) 7.2 3.2 3.5 
Wholesale Trade (42) 6 4.5 1.5 
Real Estate, Rental and Leasing (53) 3.7 5.1 5.3 
Finance and Insurance (52) 4.7 2.2 3.1 
Health Care and Social Assistance (62) 4.2 7.7 2.9 
Information (51) 2.6 1.4 4.2 
Transportation and Warehousing (48) 2.9 3.3 2.4 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation (71) 3.1 2.1 3.2 
Accommodation and Food Services (72) 3.9 9.1 10.9 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and hunting (11) 1.4 0.4 2 
Mining (21) 0 0.3 0.5 
Utilities (22) 0 0.1 0.5 
Management of Companies and Enterprises (55) 0 0.1 6.7 
Unclassified (99) 0 2.2 5.6 
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, Baseline data: Tabulations by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc; 
and Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, from longitudinal data (established 
with some first-quarter payroll) provided by the U.S. Census Bureau; Reynolds, P. 2004. 
Entrepreneurship in the United States Assesment, Miami, Fla: Florida International University. 
 
The distribution of firms by industry shows by comparison to the U.S Census that the 
KFS has a higher proportions of businesses in many industries such as manufacturing, 
professional management, education, retail and wholesale, finance and insurance, just to cite a 
few. However, the KFS has a lower proportion of firms in construction, health care and social 
assistance, and accommodation and food services (see Table 1.2). 
                                                            
7 From A. Robb et al.  “An overview of the Kauffman Firm Survey”, Results from the 2004-2007 Data”, 
2009 
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The sample surveyed shows that the majority of firms start as small with fewer than 5 
employees (75.1 percent). Also, the distribution of firms by size shows similarities with the 
Census. For example, 10.35 percent of the KFS sample start with 10 or more employees, 
compared to 10.4 percent8 in the Census. Table 1.3 also shows that the KFS was not able to 
capture any firm in its sample with 500 employees or more. The Foundation suggests this could 
be because few firms have the capacity to begin at such a large scale. Note that the number of 
small firms with fewer than 5 employees and the ones with 20 or more employees are a bigger 
part of the distribution by 2007. On the other hand, firms with 5 to 19 employees are a smaller 
part of the distribution by 2007.  
Table 1.3 
Distribution of Firms by Employment Size Category9 in Percentages 
 
Number of Employees All firms in 2004 All surviving Firms in 2007 
1-4 75.1 76.7 
5-9 14.6 13.0 
10-19 6.6 6.0 
20-99 3.4 3.8 
100-499 0.3 0.4 
500+ 0.0 0.010 
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, Baseline data; Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small 
Business Administration, Statistics of U.S. businesses, U.S. Census, 2004. 
 
The KFS reports an 89.6 percent survival rate in the first year of activity. This rate is 
higher than those found in previous studies. For instance, the U.S. Small Business Administration 
                                                            
8 A. Robb et al.  “An overview of the Kauffman Firm Survey”, results from the 2004-2007 data”, 2009. 
 
9 From A. Robb et al.  “An overview of the Kauffman Firm Survey”, results from the 2004-2007 data”, 
2009. 
 
10 This number rounds to 0.0. Actual number is 0.04. 
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found the survival rate of single establishment firms founded in 1997 was only 75 percent in the 
first year. The CBO has found rates similar to the U.S. Small Business Administration for 
different cohorts of single establishment firms (Shane, 2008). The KFS could be registering 
higher rates for a simple reason: firms created in the beginning of 2004 and closing shortly after 
may have been omitted from the sample due to the screening method. Therefore, a firm that 
would have closed before the baseline survey was issued in 2005 could not be part of the 
sample11. 
1.3 Variable Description and Model Specification 
• The variables 
 
The KFS reports a wide range of information regarding the birth and evolution of 
establishments in the sample. I concentrate on a small part of the firms’ descriptive and financial 
variables. I also took into consideration the industry in which the firms operate because the 
environment of operation could affect survival rates (Huynh et al. 2008, Thompson 2005, Mata 
and Portugal 1994.) The variable describing survival is the dependant variable and takes the form 
of a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is active (survived), and equal to 0 if inactive (out of business) 
respectively during 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007. 
Only firms created in 2004 and that survived the first year are part of the sample. As 
previously stated, a firm is considered to be out of business if it was sold to another business, 
merged with another business, has temporarily stopped operation (those observations were 
dropped) or just closed. To correct for non-response, I added the condition that a firm needed to 
be active in the previous year as well. Thus, survival in a current period is equal to 1 only if 
survival in the previous period is also equal to 1 and the business has not been declared to be out 
of business in the current period.  
                                                            
11 Hall (1987) suggests that the sample bias created by the earlier death probability of younger firms is not a 
problem in her study of growth. 
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I created three models. The first two models (M1 and M2) control for firm specific 
variables, with M2 adding leverage dummies to M1. M3 completes the series, adding an industry 
specific variable. I use the total number of employees on the firm’s payroll (part time and full 
time) to proxy for the size of the firm. Most reasonable measures of size are positive functions of 
number of employees. The total value of assets and revenues could be good proxies for size but I 
believe that the number of employees is a better proxy. The reason is straightforward. The value 
of assets recorded in the KFS is most likely the book value, and therefore, has depreciation 
accounted for. Thus, although the firm can remain the same size from one year to the next, its 
recorded asset value will decrease. Moreover, firm’s asset value described by the survey is 
classified in range variables. I could not use sales as a measure of size for the same reason. Thus 
the proxy for size is the first control variable on the right hand side (RHS) of M1. The total 
number of employees variable does not include the number of owner-operators. Regressions were 
run adding the number of owner-operators to the total number of employees and results were 
found to be similar12. 
The survey reports the years of experience each owner has in the industry previous to the 
creation of the firm, giving me the second control variable on the RHS of M1- owners’ previous 
industry experience proxies for quality of the firm. The intuition is that the more the owners have 
experience in the related industry prior to starting the firm, the higher the probability for it to be 
of a higher quality. Thompson (2005) studies the effects of previous years of experience in the 
industry in which the firm competes and finds it to be highly significant and important. I adopt 
the same approach.  
I constructed the experience of the firm by calculating the mean experience brought in by 
each owner. The survey has an upper bound for years of experience equal to 40 years. Whether 
                                                            
12 See Appendix 1.1 for results of first year regression on current conditions and last year regression on 
initial conditions using M3. 
18 
 
the corresponding owner has 41 or more years of experience, he/she is registered as having 40+ 
years of experience bringing me to censor the years of experience variable from above, and lock 
it to a maximum of 40. Assuming decreasing returns to experience, censoring from above should 
have little or no consequence. The latter assumption means that the marginal product of human 
capital is assumed to be decreasing. The argument could be made in which mean owners’ relevant 
experience is not the best measure of the firm’s experience. An average weighted according to the 
time put in the company by each owner would be a better measure. The more an owner works in 
the company, the higher the weight of his experience. Unfortunately, this method is impossible to 
apply given the data. The possibility of decreasing returns to experience is allowed for by 
including the square of the relevant experience. 
Following the literature13, each firm in each period had their leverage calculated as a debt 
to value ratio14 defined as debt over assets and both values are reported by the survey. The KFS 
describes “total debts” to be the sum of the total debt owed by the owners’15and in the business’ 
name.16 “Total assets” is the sum of all assets held by the firm. The dataset reports range variables 
for “total debt” and “total assets.”17 Operations not being possible on range variables, I use the 
ranges’ midpoints as point of reference (I did not have access to the ranges’ means and medians). 
The use of the median technique has been exploited in previous research 18  including some 
                                                            
13 See Cooley and Quadrini (2001) and Huynh et al. (2008). 
  
14 Debt to value =debt / (debt+equity) = debt / assets and debt = assets – equity. 
 
15 Debt taken by owner = personal credit cards balance, personal loans taken from bank or family members 
or any other creditor, business credit cards for which the owner is responsible. 
 
16 Debt taken under business name= credit cards balance established for the business, bank loans for the 
business, credit line of business, any other kind of loans taken under the business name (such as family,  
government, employees, other businesses). 
 
17 The survey classifies financial information under range variables. 
 
18 Kennickell (1997) suggests that range variables reported in the Survey of Consumer Finances is a 
limitation to research and thus suggests in  Kennickell (1998) to use the midpoints of the respective ranges. 
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working papers using the KFS19 and is accepted as an admissible replacement for real values. 
Asset values are book values and therefore are subject to depreciation.  
A firm’s calculated leverage is classified into dummy variables (five dummies were 
created). A leverage dummy equal to 0 at a given period  means that the firm has not reported any 
debt and therefore the firm is financed entirely by equity (because of collinearity, this dummy 
was omitted from the regression). A leverage higher than 0 and lower than 1 in a given period 
means that the firm reported some existing debts of an amount smaller than its assets value and 
some positive equity was reported by the firm.  A company that finances its assets completely 
with debt in a given time shows a leverage equal to 1. A leverage equal to 1 means that the 
company has no equity or no equity left. An overleveraged firm has a leverage greater than 1 and 
has negative equity. The assets value is worth less than the debt owed by the firm. It could also be 
an indication that the firm has used some of the debt to pay for services or other aspects of 
business not describable as assets. I expect to see a negative value on this leverage. An infinite 
leverage20 is the worst situation for a firm and could be thought of as a firm that borrowed money 
but has no assets to justify the debt. The firm spent the entire amount of the debt on expenses 
without accumulating any form of assets (e.g., locals, stock, machinery etc). I expect the 
coefficient attributed to this variable to be the most negative in the regressions. A firm with 
infinite leverage only has negative equity. 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
19  The working paper by Braymen and Neymotin entitled “Immigrant enclaves and the success of 
entrepreneurial ventures” (december 2, 2009) assigned midpoints to the range variables whenever the 
respondent was asked to choose a range in the KFS. Robb and Coleman’s working paper entitled “The 
impact of financial capital on business performance: a comparison of women- and men-owned firms” (may 
7, 2009) uses a similar approach. 
 
20 Although a division by 0 is algebraically undefined, the reader must consider that the assets’ value is 
never really 0. The value of assets is more likely to tend to 0 so the limit on the ratio goes to infinity. 
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Table 1.4 
Percentage in Two-digit Industries with Fewer than 20 Employees in 2004 
 
Industry description 
Firms 
with 
number 
of 
employees 
below 20 
Forestry, fishing, hunting, and agriculture 
support 
93% 
Mining 82% 
Utilities 71% 
Construction 91% 
Manufacturing 69% 
Wholesale trade 86% 
Retail trade 86% 
Transportation and warehousing 83% 
Information 80% 
Finance and insurance 90% 
Real estate and rental and leasing 95% 
Professional, scientific, and technical 
services 
92% 
Management of companies and enterprises 66% 
Administrative and support and waste 
management and Rremediation services 
83% 
Educational services 76% 
Health care and social assistance 85% 
Arts, entertainment, and recreation 84% 
Accommodation and food services 72% 
Other services (except public 
administration) 
93% 
Note: The percentages represent how many firms employing  
the number of employees described by the scale variable can  
be found in the industry as of 2004. 
 
The scale variable represents the percentage of firms in the observation’s two-digit 
industry that employs fewer than 20 employees (see Table 1.4). Åstebro and Bernhardt (2003), 
use two variables for 1 to 19 employees and 1 to 49 employees, the first variable being a subset of 
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the second. Regressions were run using Åstebro and Bernhardt and adding their variables do not 
add explanatory power to the study (The results can be found in Appendix 1.2).  
• Model specification 
The dependent variable of interest (survival in a given period) is a dichotomous 
qualitative variable with outcomes survive=1 and exit=0. Therefore, a binary response regression 
model is needed in order to quantify the probability of survival. This study will use probit. As 
stated in the previous section, there are three model specifications. Each specification was run for 
survival in 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
It is perhaps unusual to run separate regressions in order to capture the evolution of each 
variable over time and their influence on survival from one year to the next. Researchers usually 
use weighted regression models over many years (Geroski et al. 2010, Huynhh et al. 2008). 
Hazard models seem to be the most used tool of analysis although Mata and Portugal (1994) 
found similar results no matter the regressions (Weibull, ordered probit, ordered logit, Cox 
proportional hazard) using different model specifications, different assumptions of distribution 
and different sample definition. Hence probit should be just as effective and it has the advantage 
to be an easier model. The disadvantage of running separate probit regressions is that time effects 
cannot be controlled for. However, using the KFS, I only have access to one cohort of firms 
created in 2004. Thus, no age variable could be used in the regression and I could not test directly 
the age theory (this means that there is no age effect because firms are all the same age). 
Moreover, Thompson (2005) shows that the age effect on exit is eliminated when quality proxies 
are added to the regression. Thompson (2005) uses prior experience to proxy for quality and 
concludes that the age effect found on survival could be explained by selection bias. Hence, a 
separate probit should be a good tool of analysis. 
Assuming that the total number of employees is a good proxy for size and considering 
that it has been used as such in many papers (Geroski et al. 2010, Mata and Portugal 1994), I 
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introduce it as a control variable in the base regression model. The M1 model is a simple model 
that controls only for size and quality, using total number of employees and the owners’ mean 
industry experience as respective proxies. Decreasing returns to experience were also allowed for 
by using the square of the mean relevant experience variable. 
Some studies have been conducted on the determinants of growth over time, while others 
have focused on the initial starting size (Dunne et al. 1989, Mata and Portugal 1994, Haveman 
1995, Audretsh and Mahmood 1994, Geroski et al. 2010, Sharma and Kesner 1996, Mitchell 
1994). A simple reason for the higher failure rate of smaller firms is that larger firms have the 
option to downsize when needed (cut expenses). Moreover, in difficult times, larger firms can 
withdraw from dying markets and refocus on the ones still alive. The withdrawing choice is more 
difficult for smaller firms because of the smaller scope of their operations. Others 21  have 
suggested that larger firms are less susceptible to financial constraints and therefore have access 
to funds during unexpected difficult times or even to finance projects. An interesting alternative 
explanation deals with the costs of production. There are lower costs associated with producing at 
a larger scale (Lucas 1978). These lower costs could happen for two reasons. First, a larger size 
allows the firm to operate further down the cost curve. The second reason is that fewer financial 
constraints allow the firm to operate at higher scale. Moreover, the bigger a firm is, the closer to 
the minimum efficient scale (MES) of production it is and the lower its costs of production. 
Geroski et al. (2010) also report a non-instantaneous increase in survival prospects as a firm’s 
size increases. This latter relationship between survival and size is partly consistent with 
Jovanovic (1982), in which firms adjust their size instantaneously (by learning about their 
efficiency as time goes by) according to past performance, and only current size matters in 
predicting survivability. The KFS allows me to see if size is indeed an increasing factor of 
                                                            
21 Fazzari et al. (1988) was a pioneer paper that asked the cash flow effect on investment question.  
Zingales 1998, like Fazzari et al. (1998), study the effect of capital market imperfections on survival. They 
find that highly leveraged firms are less likely to survive. 
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survivability22. Regarding the founding conditions, entering larger sends a positive signal and 
relaxes the liquidity constraints proposed by Evans and Jovanovic (1989). Thus, I expect positive 
and significant coefficients on the number of employees in both current and founding conditions 
regressions. 
  Pre-entry relevant experience has also been shown to be an important predictor of 
survival.  After showing pre-entry relevant experience to be a good proxy for quality, Thompson 
(2005) affirms that relevant experience does indeed have persistent effects on survival and 
moreover, the effects do not decay over a long period of time. Geroski et al. (2010) indirectly test 
the hypothesis (following previous research like Wernerfelt 1984, Barney 1991 and Youndt et al. 
1996) that human capital is the factor that provides the hedge because it cannot be replicated by 
the competitors. Geroski et al. (2010) use education as a proxy for human capital, and find that 
education reduces the hazard of exit. Lucas (1978) shows that having better quality human capital 
allows a firm to lower its cost at any given level of production, thus seeking to produce at a larger 
scale.  
The link between financial variables and firm dynamics has just recently started to attract 
the attention of researchers. Lack of financial data was the main reason empirical studies proved 
to be a challenge. Firms are reluctant to disclose information regarding their financial structure. 
Whenever the financial data is available, sampled firms are already too old and have already 
overcome the first stages of growth. We know that younger firms grow faster than older, and that 
survival is positively related to age (Evans 1987, Dunne et al. 1989). Thus, if the sample is aged, 
we can assume that exit rates will be too low to conduct interesting research. This is commonly 
referred to as a sample bias problem23.   
                                                            
22 I do find an increase in the coefficient on size for the second year. I also find that the coefficient on size 
is greater on current state than the coefficient on initial state. 
 
23 See Hall (1987). 
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The model M2 adds five financial leverage dummies to the base model. Huynh et al. 
(2008) used quintiles dummies and found that the nonlinear model fitted the data better than the 
linear one. Thus, adding dummies to the regression (different slopes) helps me model the 
nonlinear property of leverage on survival.  
Cases were found with reported assets value equal to 0. These observations are associated 
with an infinite ratio representing the worst case of financial state for the firm. No debt was 
reported in some cases and, as previously stated, the corresponding dummy was omitted from the 
regression (for collinearity purposes). 
There is empirical evidence reporting that higher debt decreases the probability of 
survival. Huynh et al. (2009) found that once they control for size and productivity, firms with 
high level of leverage (debt to value ratio measured debt over assets) face an increasing failure 
risk with an increase in leverage. Alternatively, firms with low to moderate leverage have higher 
survival chances. Huynh et al. (2008) look at the introduction of the initial debt to value ratio into 
the firm dynamics and found it to be economically and statistically significant. They find that the 
higher the debt to asset ratio is at birth, the lower the life expectancy of the firm. However, it is to 
be noted that it is the increase in the debt to asset ratio that is dangerous and therefore it could 
either be an increase in debt or a decrease in asset value (book value depreciation maybe).Myers 
(1977) had already suggested that higher level of debt may limit a firm’s real value. Access to 
debt can influence survival trough both a positive and a negative relation. On the one hand, the 
more a firm has access to debt, the more it can finance its activities and therefore survive. On the 
other hand, the more debt a firm owes, the higher the temptation to walk away from the debt 
when found in harsh economic conditions. The debt to value ratio allows me to measure the 
financial obligations of a firm for each value unit of assets (book value) it has. Huynh et al. 
(2009) control simultaneously for size, age and leverage and find that initial asset value had a 
positive effect on growth, providing evidence to the “deep pocket theory” suggested by Zingales 
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(1998). The higher the asset stock at creation, the more positive the message sent to debt 
institutions and the more the firm has access to debt to finance its growth.  
Huynh, Petronia and Voia research was conducted on the startup financial conditions and 
on a sample of manufacturing firms. Actually, most of the papers I have come across testing for 
leverage effects (financial conditions) onto survival or growth were done on a sample of 
manufacturing firms. Those results should be tested on other industries due to the fact that the 
manufacturing industry is highly capital-intensive. The KFS also provides me with a higher range 
of smaller industries. The interesting question would be whether or not increasing debt in the firm 
youth is a predictor of exit, while controlling for industry scale? This question will be addressed 
in the third model. 
The literature on firm dynamics emphasizes the importance of industry specific variables 
along firm specific variables. Audretsch (1991) looks at industrial variables effects on survival 
and found that survival rates do vary across industries; a finding that previous empirical research 
had not reported. Audretsch indicates that industry’s specific technical conditions as well as 
industry’s demand are important predictors of survival. Audretsch and Mahmood (1994), expends 
Audretsch (1991) by adding macro variables and firm level variables such as size and ownership. 
Audretsch and Mahmood (1994) shows that size, when added to industry scale variables, can 
influence survival positively and thus reduce the negative effects of higher scale on survival. The 
literature24 indicates that the bigger a firm is, the closer it will be to the MES and therefore 
operate at a lower point on the cost curve, reducing cost and increasing profit, thus increasing 
chances of survival.   
The third model adds a scale variable defined as the percentage of firms found in the two 
digits NAICS industry code in 2004 (represents date of entry for the sample) with fewer than 20 
employees.  Åstebro and Bernhadt (2003) find entering a small scale industry is a positive 
                                                            
24 Geroski et al. (2010), Mata and Portugal (1994).  
26 
 
predictor of survival while entering a high scale industry is a negative predictor of survival. 
Åstebro and Bernhadt run probit regressions and found that initial entrance into a higher scale 
industry is a hazard for survival. The coefficient attributed to their variable representing a scale of 
fewer than 50 employees was negative and twice as big in magnitude as compared to the 
coefficient on the variable representing a scale of fewer than 20 employees (positive sign). The 
research and results provided by Åstebro and Bernhadt are only giving information on the 
founding conditions. I am not aware of a study that joins a leverage variable to an industry scale 
variable. I trust that M3 will help understand whether the impact of debt is increased or decreased 
when industry scale is controlled for. 
Audretsch and Mahmood (1994) have studied the effect of concentration in an industry 
on survival and they have found it to be significantly negative. Geroski et al. (2010) suggest the 
more concentrated the industry at time of entry, the less the chances of exit, with the effects 
disappearing post entry. Geroski et al. (2010)’s finding on industry concentration supports the 
trial by fire hypothesis and suggests that the fittest survive in a highly concentrated market, hence 
in reality high concentration at entry increases probability of exit for the unfit firms. Once a firm 
enters a highly concentrated market and survives, it is more likely it will prosper in the future.  
The scale variable proxies for the scale of the industry in which the observation is 
operating. When the scale variable is not in the model, the number of employees accounts for its 
effects via the MES theory. A firm’s large size represents the will to reach a higher scale of 
operation bringing the coefficient on size down. Once the scale variable is added, correcting for 
its effect on size, the coefficient on size should increase. Assuming Geroski et al. (2010) are right; 
I should observe insignificant results on the years following entrance25. Moreover, assuming that 
low scale industries are associated with high competitive forces—and conversely that high scale 
                                                            
25  Concentration was found insignificant in previous studies like Mata and Portugal (1994) and 
Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht (2004). 
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industries are associated with strong negative forces at entrance due to incumbents’ market 
control—entry in a low scale industry should decrease26 probability of survival. 
1.4 Empirical Results 
• Effects of current year conditions on survival in the following period 
Results for this section are presented in Tables 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7. The model M1 returns a 
positive, significant and persistent effect of size on survival. The literature has reported that the 
bigger a firm is, the more it can access external debt27 to finance growth and survive (Dunne et al. 
1989, Thompson 2005). The coefficients found for each year on size suggest that size contributes 
consistently to the probability of survival next year.  
The coefficient on the total number of employees goes up once the industry scale is 
accounted for in 2005 and 2006. An increase on the total number of employees’ coefficient is 
expected because we know that total number of employees accounts for at least two effects in 
M1and M2. First, how successful the firm is (the more employees the firm has, the better it is 
doing)—this effect is positive. Second, how much employees are needed in the industry (the more 
employees a firm has the higher the probability it is in a higher scale industry and therefore the 
lower the probability of survival)—this effect is negative. By adding the industry scale variable to 
M2, I am controlling for the number of employees needed in the industry, which was previously 
bringing the coefficients on size down. Therefore the coefficient on the number of employees has 
to go up in the third model as compared to M1 and M2.  
The mean experience in the industry, which is a proxy for quality, also proves to be an 
interesting predictor of survival. The coefficient is always really significant and positive. The 
coefficient on experience does not fluctuate much across models, suggesting that its effects on 
survival are somehow independent from other predictors. However, we do notice that the 
                                                            
26 Hannan and Carrol (1992) asserts that competition increases mortality. 
 
27  See Pointevin (1989), Zingales (1998).  
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coefficients go up from one year to the next, suggesting that experience becomes increasingly 
important for survival. As previously assumed, the quadratic variable for experience reports a 
consistently small negative coefficient indicating that relevant experience have a slight marginal 
decreasing return on survival.  
Table 1.5 
Regressions of Survival in 2005 using 2004 Control Variables 
 
Models M1 M2 M3 
Control Variables in2004 
Probability 
of survival 
in year 
2005 
Probability 
of survival 
in year 
2005 
Probability 
of survival 
in year 
2005 
Total number of employees 0.026 0.023 0.028 
(2.39)** (2.10)** (2.50)** 
Relevance of experience 0.033 0.031 0.029 
(3.56)*** (3.27)*** (3.06)*** 
Quadratic of  the relevance  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
of experience (2.88)*** (2.60)*** (2.48)** 
Leverage between 0 and 1 _ 0.169 0.171 
(1.96)* (1.98)** 
Leverage equal to 1 _ 0.029 0.035 
(0.31) (0.36) 
Leverage greater than 1 _ -0.167 -0.165 
(1.64) (1.62) 
Leverage is infinite _ -0.203 -0.2 
(2.14)** (2.10)** 
Portion in the industry with  _ _ 1.847 
fewer than 20 employees (2.85)*** 
Constant 1.379 1.399 -0.21 
(22.97)*** (18.67)*** (0.37) 
Observations 4582 4582 4582 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Adding leverage dummies to the regression consistently bring the coefficients on size 
down. Thus, size must be accounting for a portion of the contribution of leverage on survival, 
which confirms the important role of financial structure on survival.  
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As previously stated, some studies28 found that the hazard of exit was augmented by debt 
and hence debt had a negative effect on survival. The M2 model output reaffirms the results 
found in Huynh et al. (2008) and (2009). The coefficients associated to leverage with more debt 
than asset are negative and the larger the difference, the more negative the coefficients become 
(the coefficients on infinite leverage are more negative than the coefficients on leverage greater 
than 1). Therefore more debt increases the incentive to walk away and close the company as 
opposed to finance growth (the second hypothesis is stronger than the first one). 
During the first year of activity, survival probability is increased when assets are financed 
with debt and equity. A debt amount below the assets value means that the owners have some 
positive equity in the company and therefore have an incentive to put more efforts into running 
the company, which in turn increases the probability of survival. In this scenario the positive 
effect dominates. The incentive to walk away from the debt is low because of the positive equity. 
The coefficient on leverage between 0 and 1 is only significant in the first year. The negative 
effects associated with the coefficients on infinite leverage are significant for 2005 and 2006 and 
increase from one year to the next. The increase suggests that if the firm has not financed some 
assets with the debt it owes by the second year, its exit probability is increased, confirming the 
second hypothesis regarding the effects of debt (walking away from it). Leverage significance 
disappears as the firms enter their third year (I explain below that only initial effects are still 
significant by then). Current leverage becomes an insignificant predictor of survival as the firm 
becomes older. Checking the validity of both theories as the cohort ages will be possible as more 
data waves are released. Note that when running linear regressions with size as the dependant 
variable, I find that the more balanced the leverage is (leverage = 1), the larger the firm (see 
Appendix 1.3). 
 
                                                            
28 Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Huynh et al. (2008) and (2009), Huynh et al. (2009). 
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Table 1.6 
Regressions of Survival in 2006 using 2005 Control Variables 
 
Models M1 M2 M3 
Control Variables in 2005 
Probability 
of survival 
in year 
2006 
Probability 
of survival 
in year 
2006 
Probability 
of survival 
in year 
2006 
Total number of employees 0.029 0.027 0.028 
(3.20)*** (2.94)*** (3.02)*** 
Relevance of experience 0.034 0.034 0.033 
(3.43)*** (3.35)*** (3.27)*** 
Quadratic of  the relevance  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
of experience (2.65)*** (2.58)*** (2.52)** 
Leverage between 0 and 1 _ 0.097 0.099 
(1.19) (1.22) 
Leverage equal to 1 _ 0.066 0.069 
(0.61) (0.64) 
Leverage greater than 1 _ -0.071 -0.069 
(0.59) (0.57) 
Leverage is infinite _ -0.264 -0.264 
(2.22)** (2.22)** 
Portion in the industry with  _ _ 0.616 
fewer than 20 employees (0.82) 
Constant 1.233 1.234 0.694 
(19.16)*** (16.35)*** (1.05) 
Observations 3664 3664 3664 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The M3 model shows that entering a smaller scale industry increases the probability of 
survival. Assuming that lower scale industries are less concentrated because of lower barriers of 
entry, this finding contradicts the common belief29 that competition increases exit rates. However, 
these negative effects are active as the density within the industry is increasing and the market 
becomes crowded with firms. Hence, it could be that the markets are not crowded yet as the firms 
enter their respective low scale industry. Not surprisingly, the industry scale variable is only 
significant the first year, confirming Geroski et al. (2010) that found that the effects of industry 
                                                            
29 See Hannan and Carrol (1992). 
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concentration at entrance disappear after the first year. Once a firm enters an industry, this 
decision cannot be reversed. The effects are therefore only visible on the first year and in the 
founding conditions. Thus it is the industry entrance choice that is significant and the current 
activity in a specific industry. According to the “trial by fire” hypothesis, a firm entering a highly 
concentrated market and surviving the first year has more chances to survive and prosper in the 
future. Only the firms with the financial capacities (deep pocket theory) should adventure 
themselves in a higher scale industry for the prospects of higher potential price-cost margins. 
However, the higher scale industry (percentage of firms in the two digit SIC code industry with 
more than 20 employees) is associated with a negative effect on survival, which raises the 
question: why would a firm with low financial capacities choose to enter a high scale industry? I 
suggest a possible intuitive explanation. A higher scale industry requires heavy investments and 
higher sunk costs as compared to a smaller scale industry. However, the border line is not 
perceivable (in my definition the marginal employee puts the firm into the higher scale) and firms 
enter a higher scale industry because of expectations of higher revenues (higher price-cost 
margin). Pre-entrance, the firm has expectations on costs and revenues. However, those 
expectations are prone to noise. Once a firm enters, the noise is reduced as time passes and the 
firm learns about the financial burden associated with higher cost forced by the scale and lower 
revenues due to the incumbents’ market power. When the noise is eliminated, and the firm 
realizes the true requirements associated with operating in a higher scale industry, it decides to 
continue its operation(s) or exit. Firms commit the mistake of entering a higher scale industry 
because they perceive a “mid-scale industry” between the smaller and higher scale. This “mid-
scale” is believed easier to reach than the higher scale, and is expected to provide the firm with 
higher revenues. Hence the firm commits the mistake to enter and exits later. 
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Table 1.7 
Regressions of Survival in 2007 using 2006 Control Variables 
 
Models M1 M2 M3 
Control Variables in 2006 
Probability 
of survival 
in year 
2007 
Probability 
of survival 
in year 
2007 
Probability 
of survival 
in year 
2007 
Total number of employees 0.029 0.026 0.026 
(3.39)*** (3.08)*** (3.01)*** 
Relevance of experience 0.037 0.036 0.036 
(3.60)*** (3.52)*** (3.52)*** 
Quadratic of  the relevance -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
of experience (2.86)*** (2.79)*** (2.80)*** 
Leverage between 0 and 1 _ 0.061 0.06 
(0.75) (0.74) 
Leverage equal to 1 _ 0.097 0.097 
(0.88) (0.88) 
Leverage greater than 1 _ -0.114 -0.114 
(0.94) (0.94) 
Leverage is infinite _ -0.165 -0.165 
(1.3) (1.3) 
Portion in the industry with _ _ -0.181 
fewer than 20 employees (0.24) 
Constant 1.093 1.095 1.254 
(16.24)*** (14.06)*** (1.92)* 
Observations 3092 3092 3092 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
• Effects of founding conditions on survival in the following periods 
As previously suggested by Mata et al. (1995) Tables 1.8 and 1.9 show that initial size 
has persisting positive effects on survival later in the life of the firm. Initial size carries minimal 
decrease in coefficients in the years following birth. I find that the coefficients on initial size are 
below those found in Tables 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7, hinting to size in the current year being more 
important for survival than founding size, echoing the results found in Mata et al. (1995). 
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Table 1.8 
Regressions of Survival in 2006 using 2004 Control Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 Experience has similar coefficients for current and founding conditions. Geroski et al. 
(2010) suggested that the most valuable experience is the founding experience but my results 
report a slightly larger coefficient on experience for current conditions. That said, coefficients on 
relevant experience are not statistically different in the 95 percent confidence interval. Hence, 
despite the non-negligible contribution made by initial experience, current experience remains an 
important contributor to survival. I believe that this is a result of the correlation between current 
Models M1 M2 M3 
Control Variables in 2004 
Probability 
of survival 
in year 
2006 
Probability 
of survival 
in year 
2006 
Probability 
of survival 
in year 
2006 
Total number of employees 0.02 0.017 0.02 
  (2.72)*** (2.21)** (2.65)*** 
Relevance of experience 0.033 0.032 0.031 
  (4.48)*** (4.29)*** (4.04)*** 
Quadratic of  the relevance  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
of experience (3.43)*** (3.26)*** (3.09)*** 
Leverage between 0 and 1 _ 0.036 0.039 
  (0.55) (0.6) 
Leverage equal to 1 _ 0.094 0.101 
  (1.22) (1.31) 
Leverage greater than 1 _ -0.179 -0.175 
  (2.16)** (2.11)** 
Leverage is infinite _ -0.249 -0.245 
  (3.23)*** (3.17)*** 
Portion in the industry with  _ _ 1.668 
fewer than 20 employees (3.21)*** 
Constant 0.948 0.988 -0.466 
  (19.64)*** (16.43)*** (1.02) 
Observations 4582 4582 4582 
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experience and founding experience. Thinking of experience as a stock of human capital, it is 
increasing (the human capital stock is building upon the initial stock) as the firm ages. 
The coefficients associated with founding leverage dummies are significant in the cases 
with negative equity (debt is greater than assets). Firms with initial leverage greater than 1 or with 
an infinite leverage saw their probability of survival greatly diminished. A firm that starts 
operation with negative equity sees its likelihood of exit soar. This is true in 2006 and 2007. The 
coefficients on infinite leverage are decreasing in magnitude from 2006 and 2007 while the 
coefficients for leverage greater than 1 are increasing. The loss in significance associated with the 
infinite leverage coefficient can be justified with the following intuition. An infinite leverage at 
foundation is most likely going to force an exit in the first years of activity and thus less firms in 
the cohort as subject to its effects. To summarize, having negative equity at start up diminishes 
greatly a firm’s probability of survival during the first years of activity. The industry scale 
variable points to an interesting clue on the effects of industry scale on debt. It seems that 
entering a smaller scale industry reduces the negative effects brought by debt on survival. The 
coefficients associated with negative equity and infinite leverage are decreasing in magnitude 
once small industry scale is controlled for. This could be explained with the following intuition. 
The individuals entering a low scale industry most likely have to put their own assets as collateral 
(such as home). Therefore walking away from the debt is harder and efforts and time will be 
invested by owners, hence increasing the survival probability.  
Entering a small industry scale at foundation is an important and significant predictor of 
survival. The choice of operating industry is made at the firm’s entrance and thus the coefficients 
and foundation are positive and significant in both 2006 and 2007. Tables 1.8 and 1.9 also report 
that the positive effect associated with entering a lower scale industry is decreasing as the firm 
ages (from 1.668 in 2006 to 1.003 in 2007).This could be the result of an entrance into a low 
density industry that becomes more crowded as the firm ages consequently the positive effects 
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disappear to give place to—maybe—negative effects in the future. More data waves would help 
estimate how long the effects associated with an industry entrance remain a significant predictor 
of survival.   
Table 1.9 
Regressions of Survival in 2007 using 2004 Control Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1.5 Conclusion 
This paper is to be considered as an introductory study to firm dynamics using the 
Kauffman Firm Survey. My intention is to provide a starting point and a global perspective—
using the KFS—on the effects of founding and current firm’s conditions on its survival. Scholars 
Models M1 M2 M3 
Control Variables in 2004 
Probability 
of Survival 
in year 
2007 
Probability 
of Survival 
in year 
2007 
Probability 
of Survival 
in year 
2007 
Total number of employees 0.019 0.017 0.02 
(3.07)*** (2.76)*** (3.07)*** 
Relevance of experience 0.036 0.034 0.033 
(5.48)*** (5.12)*** (4.96)*** 
Quadratic of  the relevance  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
of experience (4.15)*** (3.88)*** (3.79)*** 
Leverage between 0 and 1 _ 0.025 0.025 
(0.43) (0.45) 
Leverage equal to 1 _ 0.01 0.013 
(0.15) (0.2) 
Leverage greater than 1 _ -0.265 -0.262 
(3.60)*** (3.57)*** 
Leverage is infinite _ -0.2 -0.197 
(2.85)*** (2.80)*** 
Portion in the industry with _ _ 1.003 
fewer than 20 employees (2.16)** 
Constant 0.604 0.665 -0.21 
(13.99)*** (12.46)*** (0.52) 
Observations 4582 4582 4582 
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have already covered a broad range of subjects regarding the factors prone to increase the 
probability of survival. Many theories followed by empirical evidence assert that size and 
relevant experience are positive predictors of a firm’s survival in both current and founding 
conditions. However, other dimensions specific to a firm’s financial and environmental 
conditions are more obscure. The effects of leverage and industry’s concentration are less 
evident. The available data had always been lacking financial information on a broader range of 
industries which is why most financial research on firm dynamics was directed toward 
manufacturing and high-tech industries. Research has also claimed the non negligible and even 
important effects of founding conditions on survivability in the future periods. The release of the 
KFS allows me to conduct a more suitable study on the effects of leverage and industry scale in 
the current and founding conditions. I run three different probit models on survival using both 
current and founding conditions.  
The results reaffirm the importance of size in both current and founding regressions with 
current size being more important than startup size. First, a bigger size in the current state allows 
the firm to be operating closer to the MES and hence be more efficient. Second, the bigger a firm 
is the more room it has to downgrade when needed. This last theoretical advantage is also true for 
the founding size. Moreover, bigger size at startup sends a positive signal to lenders.  
I find that relevant experience is a significant positive predictor of survival and is prone 
to diminishing returns. Like Thompson (2005), the regressions report that the importance of 
relevant experience does not decay.  
The probability of survival is decreasing with leverage and it seems that debt—when not 
justified by acquiring assets—is a negative contributor to survival.  The more debt the company 
has at startup the more likely the exit with effects decaying as the company matures. When the 
firm has negative equity, the probability of exit is found to be greater in both current and 
founding conditions regressions.  
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The effects of industry scale are significant only for industry entrance as opposed to 
yearly activity within the industry. The result that causes concern is the positive effects associated 
with entrance into a small scale industry. This goes against the generally accepted proposition 
that competition increases the probability of exit but can be justified by low density within the 
industry at time of entrance. Besides, Åstebro and Bernhardt (2003) find similar results. 
Moreover, the regressions results on M3 brings up a new proposition—entrance in a small scale 
industry reduces the negative effects of debt (more realistically of negative equity).  
As more waves and data become available, more questions can be answered which opens 
the door to future research possibilities. For example, can we estimate the time frame before 
founding conditions’ effects on survival become insignificant or what is the link between industry 
concentration and firms’ survival?  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Firms’ Survival within the Product-Service Spectrum using the KFS: How the 
Choice between Product or Service Influences Survival. 
2.1 Introduction 
Services are a large and growing part of gross domestic product (GDP) (see Figure 2.1). 
Some scholars30  believe that because service industries are labor intensive and exhibit little 
productivity growth, the increasing share of GDP could result in lower economic growth. 
However, the emergence of new technologies contradicts this belief as they have played an 
important role, in that services have actually spread to many areas because of them (the Internet, 
smart phones, etc.). In addition, some studies31 suggest that the growth associated to goods’ 
productivity is partly the result of growth in the service sector. The literature has treated services 
fairly as non-tradable as opposed to goods that are highly tradable. Therefore the trade was highly 
dominated by good-providing firms, while service-providing firms were limited to the domestic 
market. With the emergence of the Internet32 , SPs have seen their market grow and hence 
potential increase in revenues. Granted, not all services have become tradable, but firms can now 
consult, advise and diagnose online in exchange for payment. Furthermore, the development of 
new marketing strategies together with the evolution of technology has created an increasing 
amount of online firms providing services and being able to survive and even thrive.  
Bhattacherjee (2001) discusses the effects of implementing a customer relationship 
management (CRM) program into e-commerce businesses and shows how beneficial this can be 
as it moves the business focus towards customer retention. Obviously, this technology explosion 
has contributed a lot to the growth of the service branch, but it is not the only reason that more 
                                                            
30 Baumol (1967) and Baumol, Blackman and Wolff (1985). 
 
31 Raa and Wolff (1996). 
 
32 Freund and Weinhold (2002) found that the Internet contributed to a growth in service trade.  
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firms are becoming service providers (SPs) or initially start out as SPs. Abraham and Taylor 
(1996) found that firms contract service providers in order to smooth production cycles and save 
on labor costs, allowing both companies to increase profits by lowering costs. Other possible 
explanations for the increase in SPs could be linked to the change in the labor force composition. 
For instance, the increase in labor supplied by women33 as well as in female entrepreneurship34  
has contributed to the increase in SPs. Indeed, women are now overrepresented in the retail and 
service industries35. Another possibility is linked to new estimates in the literature that suggest 
that services may be income-inelastic36, allowing for greater customer retention. Entry rates may 
therefore have been higher for service providers, or they may be exiting at a slower pace. It could 
also be that more product provider firms are becoming service providers than vice versa. The 
likely explanation is a combination of all of the above. 
Firms’ survival has been covered extensively in the literature. Scholars have extensively 
researched the variables that contribute to survival in the hope of benefiting firms’ future 
planning. The majority of determinants for survival studied so far fall into two distinct categories: 
firm37 or industry38 specific variables. I am studying a new dimension that falls into the firm 
specific variable classification. Firms must also choose whether they are service providers (SPs), 
product providers (PPs) or providers of both service(s) and product(s) (PBs).  
                                                            
33 Oppenheimer (1970). 
 
34 Kalleberg and Leicht (1991). 
 
35 Watson (2003). 
 
36 Falvey and Gemmell (1996). 
 
37  Size, experience, education, owners’ profile, financial profile (assets, debt, debt-equity ratio, etc.) are 
very common variables in the literature. Klepper and Simons (2000), Thompson (2005), Geroski, Mata, 
Portugal (2010), Mata and Portugal (1994), Huynh, Petrunia and Voia, (2010) are empirical papers. Cooley 
and Quadrini (2001) is a reference at the financial theoretical level. 
 
38 Audretsch (1991) inspect the effects of industry specific variables on firms’ survival. Audretsch and 
Mahmood (1994) and Åstebro and Bernhardt (2003) add firm specific variables to industry specific 
variables.  
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Insofar as known, the study of firms’ survival from the product-service spectrum has not 
been done. This paper represents an initial step towards understanding the consequences of this 
survival choice. Thus, the main motivation for this paper is to find evidence that the decision to 
be an SP or a PP significantly contributes to a firm’s survival. I put forward the possibility that 
SPs are more likely to survive than PPs. Furthermore, there is also the possibility of providing 
both service(s) and product(s), which, according to Cohen and Whang (1997), is more 
advantageous. For example, if a firm offers extended warranties39 or maintenance to a consumer 
that purchases a new product, the firm is providing both a product and service. A maintenance 
program is seen as a long-term commitment from the consumer and a stream of revenue to the 
providing firm. Although it would be very interesting to study cases of providing both services 
and products, this paper will abstain from that in order to simplify the analysis. 
Figure 2.1 
Services as a Percentage of GDP in the U.S. 
 
 
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 
                                                            
39 Priest (2007) explains that there are two branches in the literature that adopt different views regarding 
extended warranties offered by manufacturers.  The first, and oldest, sees warranties as contracts in which 
manufacturers limit their obligations and is a negative point to the consumer. The second branch explains 
that consumers can use warranties as a signaling device in order to evaluate product reliability.  Thus, the 
first theory could be a possible contributor to PBs’ and SPs’ survival.   
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I used the Kauffman Firm Survey, in which firms are asked whether they are providing a 
product, a service or both. Using a Cox proportional hazard model, I found that  hazard increases 
when firms are good(s) providers as opposed to service(s) providers. I tested six hypotheses that 
could explain the causes of this hazard rate behavior. I allowed coefficients to differ depending on 
whether the firm was an SP, PP or PB. Although none of my stated hypotheses explain SPs’ 
higher survival capabilities, I reviewed some studies suggesting (without testing because of a lack 
of data) that SPs’ higher probability to evade taxes40 together with social psychology linked with 
human bonding and customer satisfaction could be the answer to SPs’ higher survival ability, as a 
result of increased customer retention. For instance, mechanics rely on the confidence and trust 
their customers have in them. Bolton (1998) analyses SPs customer relations and suggests that 
customer satisfaction is important for customer retention. 
The first section of the paper describes the Kauffman Firm Survey and provides summary 
statistics on the full data set. The second section describes the model used in the analysis. 
Hypotheses that could explain the possible causes of SPs’ higher potential for survival when 
compared to PPs are introduced along with a literature review. The third section presents the 
results together with a little discussion of providers of both service(s) and product(s). Finally, I 
conclude the paper with a summary of the findings and a discussion for future research 
possibilities. 
2.2 The Data 
• The Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) 
I use the public release of the KFS, a panel data set covering a broad range of topics, 
allowing the study of a sample of firms created in 2004. The data set contains information on a 
                                                            
40  Murray (1997) states:” Some retail firms, especially those with high value added (such as service 
providers), may choose not to register at all (for sales tax), in turn simply paying sales tax on their inputs.” 
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variety of topics, including financing, organizational structure and legal status, business 
characteristics and strategy, owner demographics and work behavior. 
The KFS is taken from a random sample of businesses—from the Dun and Bradstreet 
(DB) database—created in 2004. The questionnaires sent to the sample were designed by the 
Mathematica Policy Research. The baseline questionnaire was sent in 2004, and because of the 
quest for a longitudinal database, follow-up questionnaires were sent every following year. So far, 
four follow-up waves consisting of 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 data have been added.  
The development and change aspects involved with innovations in high-tech industries 
motivated the Foundation to oversample firms in these fields.  
The screening/eligibility test allowed only 15 percent of the potential pool of firms to be 
part of the sample. The initial sample of firms passed “the eligibility test” defining a new business 
in 2004 and consisted of 4,928 firms out of an initial pool of 32,429 businesses. Respondents 
were paid $50 to answer questions using a self-administered Web survey or a computer-assisted 
telephone interview. Eligibility was determined with two tests. A firm had to be a new company, 
and it had to be created individually by de novo entrepreneurs. The first test ensures that the 
company had started its activity in 2004. Therefore, if the firm had started activity in 2003 (or 
earlier) under any other form of structure, and the 2004 initial year of activity, for example, only 
marked a restructuring (e.g., sold business, renamed business, or changed activity), the firm did 
not qualify to be part of the sample. The second test checked ownership and provenance of the 
firm. It could not be a subsidiary of any other business, could not have been a spin off, nor 
inherited by previous owners. Finally, it could not be a not-for-profit company. Firms that passed 
both tests were part of the sample in the baseline questionnaire and follow-ups. As previously 
stated, there are five waves available in the current KFS. Firms that participated in the first wave 
satisfied two conditions. They first needed to be part of the baseline sample and to have survived 
the first year of activity. 
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 The possible reasons for exit were determined at the beginning of the survey. Firms that 
ceased operation temporarily were a small minority in the sample. I exclude these firms from the 
study because the survey extends five years. A firm that ceased operation temporarily (for 
example one that exits in 2005 and is seen to reappear in 2008) is dropped from the sample.  
Table 2.1 
Firms’ Outcomes (2004-2008)41 in Percentages 
 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Survived  92.3 84.2 74.6 67.6 
Closed operations 5.3 11.7 19.8 26.6 
Sold to or merged with another business 1.2 2.8 3.9 4.8 
Temporarily ceased operations or other 1.2 1.3 1.8 1.1 
 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey Microdata. Sample includes only surviving firms over the 
2004-2007 period, and firms that have been verified as going out of business over the same 
period. The original sample size in 2004 was 4,928. 
Within this study, any reason that causes the respondents to declare that the original 
business is no longer in operation under at least one of the original founders is defined as 
inactive42 (46 observations were removed because the businesses in question either changed 
ownership or temporarily stopped operations). Businesses that were sold or that merged with 
other businesses were also described as closed because of this change in ownership. The data 
show that 4.8 percent of starting firms were sold by the end of 2008. Some of the surviving firms 
chose not to answer further questions, and sample weights were adjusted accordingly. A firm 
described as active in a given year had to have been described as active in all previous years. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
41 From Robb et al. (2010)“An overview of the Kauffman Firm Survey”, Results from the 2004-2008 
Data”. 
 
42 Failure is defined differently between various studies. Hall (1987) considers mergers to be the exit of two 
firms into the creation of a new firm. The creation of a new firm is irrelevant to my study.  
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Table 2.2 
Firms’ Distribution by Industry43 in Percentages 
 
Industry Names and (Code) 
KFS New 
Employer 
Businesses 
Census 
Employer 
Firm 
Births 
PSED 
New 
Businesses 
Professional (54), Management, and 
Educational Services (61) 16.1 14.1 16.8 
Retail  Trade (44) 15.6 12.0 18.6 
Administrative and Support, and Waste 
Management and Remediation Services (56) 11.4 6.0 2.1 
Construction (23) 9.8 15.7 10.0 
Other Services (except Public Administration) 
(81) 8.0 8.5 0.3 
Manufacturing (31) 7.2 3.2 3.5 
Wholesale Trade (42) 6.0 4.5 1.5 
Real Estate, Rental and Leasing (53) 3.7 5.1 5.3 
Finance and Insurance (52) 4.7 2.2 3.1 
Health Care and Social Assistance (62) 4.2 7.7 2.9 
Information (51) 2.6 1.4 4.2 
Transportation and Warehousing (48) 2.9 3.3 2.4 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation (71) 3.1 2.1 3.2 
Accommodation and Food Services (72) 3.9 9.1 10.9 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and hunting 
(11) 1.4 0.4 2.0 
Mining (21) 0.0 0.3 0.5 
Utilities (22) 0.0 0.1 0.5 
Management of Companies and Enterprises 
(55) 0.0 0.1 6.7 
Unclassified (99) 0.0 2.2 5.6 
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, Baseline data: Tabulations by Mathematica Policy Research, 
Inc; and Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, from longitudinal data 
(established with some first-quarter payroll) provided by the U.S. Census Bureau; Reynolds, P. 
2004. Entrepreneurship in the United States Assessment, Miami, Fla: Florida International 
University. 
 
                                                            
43 From Robb et al. (2010) “An overview of the Kauffman Firm Survey”, Results from the 2004-2007 
Data”. 
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Some firms surveyed may also be firms that were created to reduce an individual’s taxes. 
Prior research, both theoretical and empirical (Åstebro and Bernhadt, 2003; Gordon, 1998), has 
shown that paying fewer taxes could be one incentive for individuals to create companies. This is 
because corporate tax rules are often advantageous compared to income tax. Some of the firms 
surveyed were therefore likely to have been created as tax shelters. I chose to correct for this issue 
by removing firms that reported no sales in all years of activity (47 observations were deleted). 
The distribution of firms by industry shows that in comparison to the U.S Census, the KFS 
has a higher proportion of businesses in multiple industries including manufacturing, professional 
management, education, retail and wholesale, finance and insurance. However, the KFS has a 
lower proportion of firms in construction, health care and social assistance, and accommodation 
and food services (see Table 2.2). 
The sample surveyed shows that the majority of firms start as small, with fewer than five 
employees (75.1 percent). Also, the distribution of firms by size shows similarities with the 
Census. For example, 10.35 percent of the KFS sample startup with ten or more employees, 
compared to 10.4 percent44 in the Census. Table 2.3 shows that the KFS was not able to capture 
any firm in its sample with 500 employees or more. The Foundation suggests this could be 
because few firms have the capacity to begin at such a large scale.  
The KFS reports a 92.3 percent survival rate in the first year of activity. This rate is 
higher than those found in previous studies. For instance, the U.S. Small Business Administration 
found the survival rate of single-establishment firms founded in 1997 was only 75 percent in the 
first year. The CBO has found rates similar to the U.S. Small Business Administration for 
different cohorts of single-establishment firms (Shane, 2008). The KFS could be registering 
higher rates for a simple reason: firms created in the beginning of 2004 and closing shortly after 
may have been omitted from the sample due to the screening method. Therefore, a firm that 
                                                            
44 Robb, Ballou, DesRoches, Potter, Zhao and Reedy (2010). 
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would have closed before the baseline survey was issued in 2005 could not be part of the 
sample45. 
Table 2.3 
Distribution of Firms by Employment Size Category46 in Percentages 
 
Number of Employees KFS New businesses Census New Businesses 
1-4 75.1 76.7 
5-9 14.6 13.0 
10-19 6.6 6.0 
20-99 3.4 3.8 
100-499 0.3 0.4 
500+ 0.0 0.047 
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, Baseline data; Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small  
Business Administration, Statistics of U.S. businesses, U.S. Census, 2004. 
The KFS baseline questionnaire and following waves ask whether the interviewed firm 
would describe itself as a service(s) provider (SP), product(s) provider (PP) or as providing both 
service(s) and product(s) (PB). Thus, each firm could only be classified in one part of the 
“product-service spectrum.” Some firms chose not to answer, and I treat them as missing data in 
this study. Table 2.4 shows that SPs seem to be the biggest part of the sample every year while 
PPs remain a smaller part of the sample as time passes. The PBs segment seems to be the only 
one not monotonically decreasing as a percentage of the sample. Indeed, they became a larger 
part of the sample from 2004 to 2005 and from 2007 to 2008. It could be because some of the 
firms that were only providing services or products decided to provide both.  
 
                                                            
45 Hall (1987) suggests that the sample bias created by the earlier death probability of younger firms is not a 
problem in her study of growth. 
 
46 From Robb et al. (2010) “An overview of the Kauffman Firm Survey”, results from the 2004-2007 data”. 
 
47 This number rounds to 0.0. Actual number is 0.04. 
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Table 2.4 
The Sample of the Surviving Population by Provider Categories in Percentages 
 
Provider 
Category 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
PB 37.4 38.4 36.1 34.5 35.0 
SP 48.0 41.3 40.6 38.4 36.8 
PP 14.3 11.3 10.1 9.6 9.1 
Missing Data 0.3 9.0 13.3 17.5 19.1 
Source: Tabulation of the Kauffman Firm Survey, 2010 release. 
Between 2004 and 2005, 20.3 percent (139) of the PPs decided to provide both services 
and products by 2005. For comparison, only 11.3 percent (259) of the SPs in 2004 provided both 
services and products in 2005. Moreover, 14.3 percent (256) of the firms providing both services 
and products in 2004 stopped providing products (became SP) and 5.8 percent (104) stopped 
providing services (became PP). Also 0.6 percent (15) of SPs in 2004 became PPs in 2005 and 
3.5 percent (24) of the PPs in 2004 became SPs in 2005. Overall, the statistics reflect a trend in 
the firms’ desire to move away from providing products. Also, it is more likely that a firm will 
move from PPs to PBs than from SPs to the PBs category. Keeping in mind that a firm’s best 
strategy is whatever maximizes its profits given its skill and resources (and referring to 
Jovanovic, 1982), the trend suggests a desire for firms to move into the PBs group. It may also be 
harder to operate as a PP than as an SP, as it is easier to add services to your portfolio if you 
already are providing a product than adding products if you are an SP, as that entails a larger sunk 
cost. A closer look at the numbers shows that a large number of the PBs have a preference for 
services, as they seem to continue providing services when deciding whether to provide services 
or products (14.3 against 5.8 percent). Another possibility is that SPs are more likely to survive 
than the PPs group. The higher failure rates associated with PPs can be seen in the representation 
of the Kaplan-Meier surviving function (see Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2 
Kaplan-Meier Survival Graph 
 
 
• Added data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
I created an industry wage variable that was built using information published in the 
Monthly Labor Review by the BLS dating from March 2008. The BLS published the seasonally 
adjusted average hourly earnings for some industries in 2005, 2006 and 2007. Thus, I needed to 
build the data for 2004 and 2008. I proceeded by assuming a linear relationship calculating the 
average growth rate from 2004 to 2005 and 2005 to 2006. This average growth was then used to 
calculate an approximation of the average hourly wage by industry in 2004 and 2008. The results 
can be found in Table 2.5. 
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Table 2.5 
Industries’ Average Wage 
 
NAICS 
 
Estimated 
Wage 04 
Wage 05 Wage 06 Wage 07 Estimated 
Wage 08 
11 17.68 18.72 19.90 20.99 22.23 
23 18.76 19.46 20.02 20.94 21.72 
31 11.47 12.06 12.98 13.32 14.00 
32 15.89 16.51 17.49 17.83 18.53 
33 16.85 17.05 17.22 17.46 17.67 
42 17.50 18.16 18.91 19.56 20.30 
44 12.15 12.36 12.58 12.80 13.03 
48 16.19 16.70 17.28 17.76 18.32 
22 26.08 26.68 27.42 27.93 28.58 
51 21.18 22.06 23.23 23.92 24.91 
52 17.14 17.94 18.80 19.66 20.58 
53 16.18 16.76 17.32 17.99 18.64 
54 17.13 18.08 19.12 20.15 21.27 
55 25.83 27.13 28.41 29.93 31.44 
56 13.75 14.19 14.56 15.11 15.59 
61 16.09 16.71 17.38 18.03 18.73 
71 8.90 9.38 9.75 10.41 10.97 
81 13.92 14.34 14.77 15.22 15.68 
 
2.3 The Model 
• The Cox Proportional Hazard Model: A semi-parametric specification 
The most appropriate method of analysis to be used in survival analysis is unambiguously 
the hazard model. I do not assume any distribution for the failure time. Subsequent to the trend 
set by the literature, this paper follows a semi-parametric specification and uses the Cox 
proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972). The model can be written as: 
ehh xjxttj )(0 0)()( ββ +=  
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where hj  represents the hazard faced by subject j and h0  the baseline hazard that everyone 
faces48. The subject hazard function is therefore a multiplicative of the baseline hazard adapted 
through an xj  vector specific to the firm j. An advantage of using the Cox model is that the 
baseline hazard function does not need to be determined. The reason behind this helpful 
characteristic is its cancelation when performing calculations in a binary-outcome analysis. The 
disadvantage of the Cox model is that it imposes proportional hazards. 
The specific model used in this study allows each independent variable within ܠܒ	to have 
different coefficients β  whether the firm j is a service provider, a product provider or a provider 
of both. Indeed, it seems logical that some variables may have different effects on the firm 
whether it is a service provider, a product provider or a provider of both. So far, in the literature, 
the results associated with all the variables known to be good predictors of survival were never 
studied from this perspective. This study offers a new point of view on the matter49.  
• The hypotheses 
There are six possible hypotheses studied in this paper for service providers to have a 
higher survival probability than product providers. These potential explanatory variables were 
picked from the literature because they are known to be predictors of survivability. Some of the 
hypotheses also emerged because SPs and PPs differ drastically in those variables. A summary of 
means can be found in Table 2.6. 
 
                                                            
48 I control for industries fixed effects and run robust regressions. 
 
49 I ran two Wald tests with chi-squared distribution for each variable used in the analysis to determine 
whether the coefficients are significantly different for SPs, PPs and PBs and if any of the variables would 
have SPs and PPs coefficient jointly equal to 0. The results can be found in Appendix 2.1. The null 
hypotheses are: βββ PBPPSP ==  and 0== ββ PPSP  
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Table 2.6 
Variables’ Mean 
 
 SPs PPs PB 
Variables Mean Mean Mean 
    
Capital per worker 36,900*** 52,200*** 49,800*** 
 (14,700) (3,080) (1,940) 
Expenses per worker 51,204*** 61,997*** 65,099*** 
 (1,255) (2,684) (1,682) 
Total expenses 162,911*** 232,647*** 232,637*** 
 (3,277) (7,661) (4,428) 
Owners’ experience 13.48*** 10.56*** 12.35*** 
 (0.126) (0.243) (0.141) 
Size 3.524*** 4.290*** 4.443*** 
 (0.0601) (0.136) (0.0817) 
Total assets 101,300*** 192,700*** 174,400*** 
 (3,370) (9,900) (5,420) 
Industry wage 17.06*** 15.79*** 16.44*** 
 (0.0336) (0.0744) (0.0466) 
Observations 6,267 1,620 4,560 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
An important aspect that differentiates SPs from PPs is the amount of capital used in both 
segments. Product providers are more capital intensive than service providers and both Audretsch 
(1991) and Audretsch and Mahmood (1994) found that capital-intensive industries tend to 
increase the hazard and could be the result of the larger investments required by higher-scale 
industries, which makes them harder to operate. The increase in the hazard can be 
counterbalanced with a higher startup size. In my study, the total assets value represents the sum 
of the firm’s total equipment, its total inventory, its real estate ownership and finally the vehicles 
bought and registered under the firm’s name. In order to control for the size effect of total assets, 
I divided it by the number of workers to create value of assets per worker.  
H1: Capital intensity is a negative predictor of survival. Product providers, on average, 
are more capital intensive than service providers. Capital intensity will explain the higher 
probability of exit for a product provider. 
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 Differing levels of expenses are another possible explanation for the greater likelihood of 
survival of service providers over product providers. As shown in Table 2.6, product providers 
have higher expenses on average than service providers. Huyhebaert, Gaeremynck, Roodhooft 
and Van de Gucht (2000) explain that firms with higher fixed coverage expenses are expected to 
fail because banks will charge them a higher interest rate, and thus a larger part of the firm’s 
funds will have to be paid to debt providers, meaning the firm has less for future investment. One 
could argue that expenses could be a proxy for size and that these two variables could therefore 
be highly correlated. This is a reasonable argument, and hence I created a variable that measures 
expenses per worker. This variable should allow the study of expenses while controlling for the 
size effect.  
H2: Higher expenses per worker will increase firms’ failure rates. Product providers, on 
average, have more expenses per worker than service providers. Higher expenses per worker 
explain the higher probability of exit for a product provider. 
Human capital is a very important predictor of survival. Together with size, it could also 
be the most studied predictor of survival. Pre-entry experience relevant to the industry has also 
been shown to be an important variable in survival studies. The survey reports the years of 
industry-specific experience each owner had before the creation of the firm. Owners’ previous 
industry experience can act as a proxy for human capital. After showing pre-entry relevant 
experience to be a good proxy for a firm’s quality, Thompson (2005) affirms that relevant 
experience does indeed have persistent effects on survival and that these effects do not decay over 
time. Geroski et al. (2010) indirectly test the hypothesis50 that human capital is the main factor 
that provides firms with an edge because it cannot be replicated by competitors. They use 
education as a proxy for human capital and find that education reduces the hazard of exit. Lucas 
                                                            
50 Following previous research such as Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984 and Youndt, Snell, Dean and 
Lepak, 1996. 
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(1978) shows that having better quality human capital allows a firm to lower its cost at any given 
level of production. The intuition is that the more experienced the owners are in the related 
industry prior to starting the firm, the higher the probability for the firm to be of a higher quality. 
I constructed the variable for the firm’s experience by calculating the mean experience brought in 
by each owner. The survey has an upper bound for years of experience equal to 40 years. If the 
corresponding owner has 41 or more years of experience, he or she is registered as having 40+ 
years of experience, bringing me to censor the years of experience variable from above and lock 
it to a maximum of 40. Assuming decreasing returns to experience, censoring from above should 
have little or no consequence. The argument could be made that mean owners’ relevant 
experience is not the best measure of the firm’s experience. An average weighted according to the 
time put in the company by each owner would be a better measure. The more an owner works in 
the company, the higher the weight of his experience. Unfortunately, this method is impossible to 
apply given the data. 
H3: Higher owners’ experience will decrease the hazard on survival. Product providers 
with a lower average experience increases the hazard rate when compared to service providers. 
Industry wage is another measure positively related to survival. Audretsch and Mahmood 
(1994) explain that industries with higher wages tend to express higher investment in human 
capital or labor-related sunk costs. Thus, industry wage proxies for human capital in the industry 
in which the firm operates. Product providers have, on average, smaller industry wages and 
higher industry wage is likely to be a positive predictor of survival, as demonstrated in Audretsch 
and Mahmood (1994). Thus product providers could be at a disadvantage compared to service 
providers. 
 H4: Industry wage will decrease the hazard rate. Product providers with a lower average 
wage are disadvantaged when compared to service providers. 
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As mentioned, the “total assets”51 variable is the sum of four variables found in the 
Kauffman Firm Survey. Those variables are range variables. Operations are not possible on range 
variables, so I have used the ranges’ midpoints as a point of reference (I did not have access to the 
ranges’ means and medians). The use of midpoints to proxy for the range values has been used in 
previous research,52  including some working papers using the KFS,53  and is accepted as an 
admissible replacement for the real values.  
Asset values are book values and therefore subject to depreciation. Asset value could be 
used as a proxy for size, and therefore, tone might expect total assets to react as a variable in the 
same way as size. However, the new findings are expressed in the results. Allowing for different 
slopes for SPs, PPs and PBs allows a determination of whether asset size could actually play a 
negative role in survival, depending on firms’ activities. As far as I am aware, there has been no 
previous research on this aspect. 
 So far, researchers have reported a general positive effect of size (and thus assets) on 
survival (Geroski et al, 2010; Mata and Portugal, 1994). One possible reason is that the higher the 
asset stock at creation, the more positive the message sent to debt institutions and therefore, the 
more access a firm has to debt to finance its growth. However, the fewer assets tied to the 
business, the more opportunities the firm has to readjust its products and services. Moreover, a 
firm’s assets are subject to depreciation, which is incurred as a cost. As such, I believe that once 
size is controlled for in H6 (assuming it to be positive on survival), the real effect of total assets 
                                                            
51 The survey classifies financial information under range variables. 
 
52 Kennickell (1998) suggests that the range variables reported in the Survey of Consumer Finances are a 
limitation to research and thus suggests in Kennickell (1999) that the midpoints of the respective ranges are 
used. 
 
53  The working paper by Braymen and Neymotin entitled “Immigrant enclaves and the success of 
entrepreneurial ventures” (2011) assigned midpoints to the range variables whenever the respondent was 
asked to choose a range in the KFS. Robb and Coleman’s working paper entitled “The impact of financial 
capital on business performance: a comparison of women- and men-owned firms” (2009) used a similar 
approach. 
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should increase the hazard rate and therefore have a negative effect on survival. Referring to 
Table 2.6, note that product providers have more assets on average than service providers. 
H5: Total assets should decrease firms’ failure rates. However, once size is controlled 
for, total assets will increase the firms’ hazard rates. Product providers with higher average 
assets value will be more likely to exit than service providers. 
Some studies have been conducted on the determinants of growth over time, while others 
have focused on the initial starting size (Audretsh and Mahmood, 1994; Dunne, Roberts and 
Samuelson, 1989; Geroski et al., 2010; Haverman, 1995; Mata and Portugal, 1994; Mitchell, 
1994; Sharma and Kesner, 1996). A simple reason for the higher failure rate of smaller firms is 
that larger firms have the option to downsize when needed (cut expenses). Moreover, in difficult 
times, larger firms can withdraw from dying markets and refocus on more viable options. The 
possibility to withdraw from markets is more difficult for smaller firms because of the smaller 
scope of their operations. Others 54  have suggested that larger firms are less susceptible to 
financial constraints and therefore have access to funds to weather difficult times or even to 
finance projects. An interesting alternative explanation deals with the costs of production. There 
are lower per unit costs associated with producing on a large scale (Lucas, 1978). The bigger a 
firm is, the closer to the minimum efficient scale (MES) of production it is and the lower its costs 
of production. The lower costs associated with the MES theory could happen for two reasons. 
First, a larger size allows the firm to operate further down the cost curve. The second reason is 
that fewer financial constraints allow the firm to operate at a higher scale. Geroski et al. (2010) 
also report a non-instantaneous increase in survival prospects as a firm’s size increases, which is 
partly consistent with Jovanovic (1982) who states that firms adjust their size (by learning about 
their efficiency as time goes by) according to past performance, and only current size matters in 
                                                            
54 Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) was a pioneer paper that asked the cash flow effect on investment 
question.  Zingales (1998), like Fazzari et al. (1998), study the effect of capital market imperfections on 
survival. They find that highly leveraged firms are less likely to survive. 
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predicting survivability. Another interesting possibility is that entering larger in size sends a 
positive signal and relaxes liquidity constraints proposed by Evans and Jovanovic (1989). On 
average, product providers are bigger than service providers. I built a size variable using the total 
number of employees including operating owners. 
H6: Size as expressed in numbers of employees will decrease the hazard rate. Product 
providers are larger on average, and therefore do not explain why product providers have a 
lower survival likelihood. 
2.4 Empirical Analysis 
I first ran a basic regression that showed being a PP increased the hazard rate by 35.5 
percent (exp (0.304) = 1.3552) compared to an SP (variable omitted from the regression). The 
results are reported in Table 2.7.  I ran two types of regressions. The first helped me understand 
whether one hypothesis alone was responsible for the results found in the base model. 
Subsequently, I ran a second set of regressions adding one variable at a time to each previous 
model. I had six hypotheses, and therefore each set of regression had six models on top of the 
base model. The different Wald tests (chi-squared distribution) rejected the null hypothesis55 
except those run on expenses per worker, owner’s experience and the industry wage variable56. 
Therefore all variables beside these three variables are allowed to have different ࢼs for service 
providers, product providers, and providers of both. 
• Survival analysis—testing one hypothesis at a time 
The variable PP is always significant, no matter which explanatory variable is used in the 
Model. This consistent significance on PP points to the fact that none of the hypotheses alone can 
explain the higher probability of product providers exiting when compared to service providers. 
                                                            
55 The null hypothesis states that all three groups’ coefficients are equal for each variable in the vector x. 
 
56 The results are reported in Appendix2.1. 
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Although I cannot come to any conclusion using these results, I can however examine how each 
variable influences PPs’ and SPs’ survival.  
Table 2.7 
Individual Regressions 
 
VARIABLES Base Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
PP 0.304** 0.341** 0.292*** 0.273** 0.303** 0.293** 0.220*
 (0.105) (0.117) (0.108) (0.107) (0.105) (0.117) (0.133) 
PB -0.128* -0.107 -0.105 -0.136* -0.129* -0.0844 -0.226** 
 (0.0774) (0.0843) (0.0791) (0.0787) (0.0774 (0.0843) (0.104) 
SP capital per  -0.0799      
Worker  (0.0510)      
PP capital per  -0.228**      
Worker  (0.111)      
PB capital per  -0.0746      
Worker  (0.0621)      
Expenses per   -0.0171***     
Worker   (0.00498)     
Owners’     -0.0164***    
Experience    (0.00387)    
Industry wage     -0.106   
     (0.0980   
SP assets      -0.0559**  
      (0.0249)  
PP assets      -0.0613*  
      (0.0338)  
PB assets      -0.0658***  
      (0.0222)  
SP size      -0.0802*** 
      (0.0191) 
PP size      -0.0480** 
      (0.0217) 
PB size       -0.0373*** 
       (0.0134) 
Observations 14,881 13,887 14,164 14,335 14,873 14,170 14,621 
Robust standard errors in parentheses,  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
First, the only significant coefficient found in the first model is the one associated with 
PP’s capital per worker despite the signs on all coefficients confirming a decrease in the hazard 
rate with an increase in capital per worker and thus rejecting hypothesis 1. It seems that capital 
per worker only plays a significant role when the firm is a product provider. The second model, 
which tests expenses per worker, returns a significant negative coefficient as well, and H2 is also 
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rejected. The third model supports H3, and the coefficient is highly significant proving again that 
owner’s experience is an important contributor to a firm’s survival. The fourth model returns an 
insignificant coefficient57 with a sign confirming the literature58 hence supporting the hypothesis 
4. Moreover, in the fifth model, PPs benefit more from an increase in assets59 (although this 
model does not control for size). The coefficients in Model 6 are significant, but the magnitude 
comparison between SPs and PPs is rather surprising. The coefficients on size seem to indicate a 
higher marginal contribution toward survival for service providers. Overall, H3 and H6 are 
supported while H5 is not relevant because I do not control for size in the fifth model. 
• Survival analysis with developed model 
Table 2.8 shows the results for this analysis. The first model adds capital per worker to 
the base model. The PP coefficient is still highly significant, and the hazard magnitude went up, 
which means that capital per worker is actually a positive predictor of survival for PP and 
provides an advantage to PPs as compared to SPs (note that the increase in PP coefficients from 
the base model to Model 1 is lower than the standard errors). Therefore I can reject the hypothesis 
1. The significant coefficient found for “PP capital per worker” tells the same story. In the base 
model, capital per worker was embedded within the model and kept the PP hazard coefficient 
down. When capital per worker is controlled for, the coefficient on PP goes up. Although capital 
per worker is always beneficial to survival, this variable proves to be a more important 
contributor to survival for PPs (a higher coefficient than SPs in absolute value). Table 2.6 shows 
that PPs have higher capital per worker on average. An increase of $100,000 reduces the hazard 
by only 7.7 percent (exp (-0.0799) = 0.9232) for SPs when it reduces the hazard by 20.39 percent 
                                                            
57 This confirms the result found in Appendix 2.1 for industry wage. 
  
58 See Audretsch and Mahmood (1994). 
 
59 According to Baumol (1967) and Baumol et al. (1985), service providers are labor intensive as opposed 
to good providers that are capital intensive.  
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(exp (-0.228) = 0.7961) for PPs. This clearly shows the importance of capital per worker for 
product providers. 
The second model adds expenses per worker to the first model. The coefficient on PP 
remains significant. The model clearly rejects H2, and higher expenses per worker reduce failure 
probability. An increase of $100,000 in expense per worker decreases the exit probability by a 
little more than 1.5 percent (exp (-0.0159) = 0.9842), and the coefficient on expenses per worker 
is significant.  
Owners’ experience is added in the third model and the coefficient on PP is still 
significant. Each additional year of experience reduces the hazard by only 1.55 percent (exp (-
0.0156) = 0.9845) for all three groups. The coefficient on PP has gone down in the third model 
(decrease is lower than the standard errors), which is in concordance with the means reported in 
Table 2.6 where we can see that SPs are, on average, more experienced than product providers. 
Hence, the effects of owners’ experience increased the hazard on PP when it was not controlled 
for. Experience is clearly a contributor to SPs higher survival probability, but the difference in 
coefficients between the second model and the third model suggests it is not the main predictor I 
was looking for. Thus, H3 is partly supported. 
Industry wage is added in the fourth model and has no effect on the PP coefficient. 
Industry wage is a proxy for experience. The higher the industry wage, the more likely firms have 
invested in human capital formation—training, management, higher percentage of white collar 
jobs. The coefficient associated with industry wage is insignificant, although its economic effect 
seems to be confirming the literature60, namely a positive predictor of survival. Thus, I can 
neither reject nor support the hypothesis 4.  
                                                            
60 See Audretsch and Mahmood (1994). 
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Model 5 adds total assets and the results confirm the first part of H5; namely, the 
coefficients associated with the different assets groups are indeed negative (the coefficient on PP 
is statistically insignificant) and thus total assets stock decreases the firms’ failure rate when size 
is not controlled.  
Size is added in the last model making Model 6 the most complete model. As expected, 
the coefficients on total assets are now positive for both SPs and PPs (and statistically significant 
for PPs), while the coefficients on size are now negative. Thus, once size is controlled for, total 
assets value does indeed increase the firms’ failure rates while size decreases them, confirming 
the second part of the hypothesis 5. Once I control for the positive effect of size, total assets 
increase the hazard rate. More assets mean higher sunk costs. On the one hand, this can be 
interpreted as a reduction in the available capital, resulting in a firm limiting its ability to finance 
future growth. On the other hand, higher sunk costs are often wrongly interpreted as being tied up 
in a business by entrepreneurs, who therefore seek to prolong the firm’s life. The entrepreneurs’ 
desire to prolong the firm’s life due to higher sunk costs is referred as the “sunk cost effect”61 in 
the literature. The model thus points to the first effect being more significant than the second. The 
coefficient on PPs, when compared to SPs, indicates that the total assets figure is a larger (and 
more significant) contributor to PPs’ failure rates—PPs’ total assets are on average larger than 
service providers.   
My results confirmed previous findings62, specifically the significant positive relationship 
existing between a firm’s size and its survival. A marginal employee increases SPs’ survival 
                                                            
61 In their paper, Arkes and Ayton (1999) attribute this attitude to the “no waste” attitude found in human 
Psychology. 
 
62 The empirical literature has been more developed on the subject with papers such as Dunne et al.  (1989); 
Mitchell (1994), Audretsch and Mahmood (1994), Haverman (1995), Geroski et al.  (2010) Huynh et al. 
(2008). Theoretically, on the other hand, size effects on growth and survival is harder to find. Jonavovic 
(1982), a reference, assumes that initial size does not matter and current size includes all the information on 
the firm history allowing survival or exit. This is contrary to some of the empirical findings cited above 
reporting the importance of initial size for survival. 
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probability by 9.6 percent (exp (-0.101) = 0.9039) and increases PPs’ survival probability by 11.3 
percent (exp (-0.120) = 0.8869). Therefore, the marginal contribution of one employee is larger 
for product providers63. The size effect is stronger on product providers than service providers. 
Product providers clearly have an advantage in this dimension, and Table 2.6 confirms that PPs 
are on average larger. Thus, H6 is also confirmed. Although this is an interesting finding, neither 
the fourth nor the fifth models explain SPs’ greater likelihood of survival compared to product 
providers. 
Overall, in the sixth model, both H1 and H2 are rejected, while H3, H5 and H6 are 
supported. The sign on the industry wage’s coefficient does seem to confirm H3, although the 
coefficient is insignificant. Thus, I can neither confirm nor reject the hypothesis 3. The coefficient 
on PP remains significant, and therefore none of the hypotheses was able to explain PPs’ higher 
failure probability. 
• Other possible explanations. 
A lack of data did not permit me to test two additional hypotheses that could contribute to 
the higher survival rate of service providers over product providers. The first one is tax evasion, 
not to be mistaken with tax avoidance. On the one hand, tax avoidance consists of finding ways 
not to pay taxes through legal means. Tax evasion, on the other hand, consists of using illegal 
means to avoid them. Tax evasion comes in many forms, and inspiration does not seem to be in 
short supply when it comes to finding new ways to escape reporting sales. Some businesses 
practice tax evasion to retain higher revenues, while others cannot report their sales to authorities 
because of the illegal nature of their activities. This kind of evasion gave birth to what is now 
referred to as the shadow, black or underground economy. Slemrod (2007) explains that the 
underground economy mostly involves the provision of services that are not necessarily illegal 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
63 This is what we would expect. Size should have a larger effect of PPs than SPs. 
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but become illicit owing to tax evasion. Davis and Henrekson (2005) claim that the underground 
economy seems to flourish as tax levels rise. This is the effect of a supply decrease in the labor 
market, and increases in home labor and the underground market. Fichtenbaum (1989) argues that 
the underground economy is mostly composed of small businesses that offer services because of 
the ease of exchanging them for cash or other services. Hence, the literature seems to agree that 
SPs are more likely to evade taxes, allowing them to increase revenues and profits. Assuming that 
higher revenues—ceteris paribus—increase survival probability, then, by transitive property, SPs 
are more likely to survive. 
Table 2.8 
Regressions Stacking Variables 
 
Variables Base Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
PP 0.304*** 0.341*** 0.326*** 0.297** 0.297** 0.251** 0.324**
 (0.105) (0.117) (0.117) (0.119) (0.119) (0.122) (0.157) 
PB -0.128* -0.107 -0.0975 -0.109 -0.109 -0.0976 -0.247** 
 (0.0774) (0.0843) (0.0843) (0.0856) (0.0855) (0.0865) (0.115) 
SP capital  -0.0799 -0.0599 -0.0700 -0.0706 0.0711 -0.0916 
per worker  (0.0510) (0.0505) (0.0535) (0.0536) (0.0583) (0.0827) 
PP capital  -0.228** -0.190* -0.179* -0.179* -0.128 -0.419*** 
per worker  (0.111) (0.102) (0.101) (0.102) (0.0833) (0.111) 
PB capital  -0.0746 -0.0502 -0.0550 -0.0557 0.0745 0.0174 
per worker  (0.0621) (0.0610) (0.0638) (0.0639) (0.0641) (0.0773) 
Expenses   -0.0159*** -0.0177*** -0.0177*** -0.0174*** -0.0172*** 
per worker   (0.00503) (0.00531) (0.00532) (0.00504) (0.00475) 
Owners’    -0.0156*** -0.0157*** -0.0149*** -0.0142*** 
experience    (0.00396) (0.00396) (0.00396) (0.00390) 
Industry      -0.153 -0.163 -0.167 
wage     (0.104) (0.103) (0.104) 
SP assets     -0.0951*** 0.000714 
     (0.0352) (0.0404) 
PP assets     -0.0237 0.112*** 
     (0.0299) (0.0408) 
PB assets      -0.0861** -0.0526 
      (0.0337) (0.0382) 
SP size      -0.101*** 
      (0.0254) 
PP size      -0.120*** 
      (0.0401) 
PB size       -0.0314* 
       (0.0174) 
Observations 14,881 13,887 13,744 13,344 13,336 13,336 13,336 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The second argument I could not study empirically gets its origins from the relationship 
marketing (RM) literature. The RM scholars agree that the relationship between a firm and its 
customers is essential for the firm’s survival64. It seems that SPs are more likely to engage in 
social human bonds with their customers that will endure for the duration of the relationship 
(Gronroos, 1990; Czepiel, 1990; Iacobucci, 1994). Bendapudi and Berry (1997) cite three main 
reasons why customers are more likely to engage in long-term relations with service providers. 
First, many services—by definition—require customers to commit to long-term relationships by 
locking them into contracts65. Cable provision, insurance, education and extended warranties, are 
just few examples of service providers locking their customers into long term contracts. Second, 
hiring an SP without committing to a long-term contract still requires a risk analysis that entails 
asymmetric information66 in the relationship, representing a cost. Changing SPs on a regular basis 
necessitates new risk analyses, and hence new costs. Retaining the same SPs minimizes cost. For 
instance, when a person finds a hairdresser that provides her/him with satisfactory results, it is 
very unlikely she/he will seek out a new hairdresser. Finally, a customer is more likely to 
establish a relationship with an organization through its employees than through its products67. 
Thus, this human aspect associated with SPs (but defaulting in PPs) should be positively linked to 
survival. 
• Some words about providers of both (PB) service(s) and product(s). 
Although this paper does not intend to study PBs, I give the reader an overview of the 
literature as well as the results found in the analysis. The data show a trend of firms shifting their 
                                                            
64 See Bendapudi and Berry (1997). 
 
65 This argument was studied in Lovelock (1983). 
 
66 From Bendapudi and Berry (1997): “…customers may seek on-going relationships with service providers 
to reduce the perceived risk in evaluating services characterized by intangibility and credence properties.” 
 
67 See Berry (1995). 
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interests from PPs and SPs to PBs (refer to the data section and Table 2.4). Theoretically, it 
makes sense for firms to become providers of both.  
They get the benefits of selling a product and attracting customers that need to visualize 
what they are paying for. At the same time, they can secure those customers into contracts that 
extend for a long period of time. According to Agrawal, Cohen and Zheng (1997) manufacturers 
are maximizing service quality with enormous markups on service parts in order to maximize 
service revenue through maintenance contracts after short warranty periods before feeling 
comfortable letting the customer seek maintenance via independent service providers. Cohen and 
Whang (1997), by means of a game-strategic set up, studied the difference between a 
manufacturer and an independent service provider that results from the differentiation in service 
quality and price. Among their findings, they argue that a large portion of a manufacturer’s 
revenue was derived from the service business offered to their customers. Empirically, I can only 
make the comparison of PBs to SPs, given PBs and PPs, both in the regressions with SPs acting 
as missing variable. Referring to both Tables 2.7 and 2.8, we established that any hypothesis 
alone—and/or together with other hypotheses—is enough to explain the higher odd of survival of 
providers of both over service providers. The significance on PB vanishes when any variable is 
added to the regression. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This study hopefully contributes positively to the literature by looking at firms’ survival 
from a new perspective. I showed that once the contributors to survival were allowed to act 
differently, when firms are differentiated in the product-service spectrum, new results could be 
found increasing our knowledge on firms’ survival. 
Using the KFS as the main dataset, I studied the consequences of the choice firms make 
on being PPs or SPs on survival. I also included the option to be a PB although this was not the 
main purpose of this study. I might need to compare PBs to both SPs and PPs in order to see how 
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beneficial it could be to firms’ survival. When the decision to enter in one part of the “product-
service spectrum” is taken, firms could benefit themselves from the general behavior of other 
similar firms. For instance, on average, we see that product providers are larger, they have more 
assets, more capital per worker and more expenses when compared to service providers. On the 
other hand, SPs are more experienced than PPs and additionally they pay higher wages68.  
 Employing a Cox proportional hazard model, I found that the base model does confirm 
service providers’ higher survival probability as compared to product providers. The behaviors 
associated with the decision to be a PP or an SP were tested to find whether one, or a combination 
of them, could explain the reasons for the higher survival probability found for service providers 
over product providers. Unfortunately, none of the stated hypotheses (capital per worker, 
expenses per worker, owners’ experience, size, assets and industry wage) could bring the 
coefficient on PP to be insignificant, and all those variables were rejected as possible explanatory 
factors in SPs higher survival likelihood. Two other possible explanations were discussed but not 
tested opening the door to future research. The first one is the higher likelihood for SPs to evade 
taxes and therefore increase revenue. Fichtenbaum (1989) explains that firms evading taxes 
(underground economy) are more likely small businesses specializing in providing service(s). The 
higher probability of evading taxes associated with service providers could explain how SPs are, 
on average, more likely to survive. The second possible explanation is the human-bonding 
experiences that service providers enjoy over product providers. Service providers can lock 
customers into long-term contracts hence insuring repeat business. Other benefits include the cost 
associated to asymmetric information emerging from the business-customer relationship and the 
human social interaction SPs are able to offer thanks to the increasing personal knowledge of 
each individual customer. 
                                                            
68 Service providers have greater values for the variables usually used to proxy experience and quality. 
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Although this paper has not found (empirically) the reasons for SPs higher survival 
probability, new findings emerged that offer a better understanding of firms’ survival. Capital per 
worker is a very important contributor to PPs’ survival. The results show that an increase of 
$100,000 in capital per worker for PPs will decrease their exit probability by 20.39 percent. The 
results found on size are contradictory to the literature69. I found that PPs seem to benefit from 
higher positive marginal effect size on survival (PPs are larger on average). Last, but not least, I 
found that an increase in assets was actually increasing the hazard for PPs, something previous 
research has not established. Once the positive effect associated with size70 is controlled for and 
when we allow the coefficients on PPs and SPs to be different, I do find a significant coefficient 
on PPs’ assets suggesting that assets in themselves are negatively related to survival.  
                                                            
69 Namely, service industries known to be labor intensive as opposed to product-providing industries that 
are known to be capital intensive, I expected the firm’s number of employees as proxy for size to have a 
higher positive marginal effect on survival for SPs. 
 
70 Assets are a good measure of size. I can assume that the more assets a firm owns the larger it is. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Why are Women-Owned Firms Associated with Higher Failure Rates? A Cross Gender 
Survival Analysis using the KFS. 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Previous research has extensively covered the field of survival and gender differences in 
business settings. Surprisingly, given the amount of studies published, researchers still have many 
disagreements about the mechanism at work in determining the effects of being women-owned on 
a startup's (or firm's) survival. More precisely, a majority of studies have found women to have 
higher failure rates than their men counterparts, but much of this effect may be explained by 
human capital, industries (Watson 2003), financial capital (Boden and Nucci 2000) or 
management style (Carter, Williams, and Reynolds 1997). Others, such as Kalleberg and Leicht 
(1991), have found no negative effects of gender on survival. These opposing results could be 
attributed to different factors. First, the definition of failure in the literature71 varies from broad to 
specific. For example, some scholars have defined failure as discontinuation 72  of the firm, 
including a change of ownership73, while others believe that a firm sold does not constitute 
failure. Another possibility for the lack of consistent results could be the lack of data on women-
owned firms.  
While comparing women- and men-owned firms’ success or failure, social and/or 
psychological aspects could be at play. The fact that women and men have had differing pasts in 
the labor market could influence the way they manage or their perception of success. Women are 
less preoccupied with profits than men (Burns, Carter, Hamilton and Rosa 1994). Therefore, if a 
man does not get a financial return greater or equal to what he would have made as an employee, 
                                                            
71 Headd (2003) studies the differences in the definitions of success and failure. 
  
72  Bates (1995); Bates and Nucci (1989); Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989) define failure as 
discontinuance. 
 
73 Churchill (1952); Watson and Everett (1999). 
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even if the firm is still profitable, he would most likely close, and the firm would be registered as 
a failure. On the other hand, a woman who gets a lower financial return from her business, as 
compared to what she could have made in the labor market, could choose to keep the company 
afloat because of the greater flexibility associated with her work schedule, hence reducing failure 
rates for women. A greater flexibility implies that she can choose when to work and still take care 
of her home. Thus, there are different maximization problems associated with gender when the 
decision to remain or exit is made. Furthermore, women and men differ in their evaluation of 
priorities (Orban 2001). 
Firm survival analysis has also been conducted using many economic variables, which 
are mostly endogenous of social differences, such as accumulated human capital. Historically, 
women have had less access to education, although the gap is now closing. The actual cross 
gender differences in education are mostly attributed to the field of education sought by women 
and men (Honing-Haftel and Martin 1986). Women are more prone to follow liberal arts majors, 
while men seem to be attracted to technical fields, such as business. Boden and Nucci (2000) 
hypothesize that the differences among genders that impose a higher burden on women-owned 
firms’ survival could be explained by the lower opportunities offered to women in the wage 
market. According to Boden and Nucci, answers to financial capital and experience differences 
can be explained by the lower wages offered to women on average and the lower managerial jobs 
women partake in. Others have used differences in industry concentrations to explain that women 
are more active in the retail and services industries, which are more competitive because they are 
associated with lower barriers of entry (Watson 2003; Coleman and Robb 2009). 
Linking both social and labor market experiences, Carter, et al. (1997) suggest that 
women can use what the authors refer to as “women dispositional characteristics” to overcome 
deficiencies induced by their “situational differences.” Situational differences result from the 
reality that women have been denied equal access to labor markets, while dispositional 
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characteristics are linked to the way women define their values and way of thinking 
(psychological aspect).  
A recurring idea in the literature relates women’s lower survival rates to women’s lower 
abilities or opportunities (depending if you view it from the demand or supply side) for them to 
gather enough financial capital for their startup to grow and survive. It is true that women tend to 
reach to debt institutions and equity holders less than men. Using the Kauffman Firm Survey 
(KFS), Coleman and Robb (2009) studied differences in startup capital by gender. Coleman and 
Robb find that women-owned startups tend to start with significantly less capital than those 
started by men, and their results remain significant regardless of the addition of controls such as 
firm’s and owner’s characteristics. Their contribution to the field was that women tend to raise 
less capital through debt and equity in the years after foundation (second and third). Considering 
this, it would be appealing to state that the inability to raise funds must be the reason behind 
women’s lower survival rates in entrepreneurship. Lee and Zhang studied survival associated 
with financial variables. They find that breaking down debt and equity into different sources was 
necessary to find the real effects of financial variables. Women have long complained of 
discrimination in the financial markets (Coleman and Robb 2009). Other papers have dismissed 
any sign of discrimination in the financial markets and have attributed the differences in access to 
financial capital to differences in human capital or the industry being operated. Thus, a review of 
the literature provides the main points as to why women are associated with higher failure rates, 
but it is difficult to say with certainty which economic variable explains this behavior.  
Most of the studies conducted on gender firms’ survival were conducted (as far as I 
know) on dated data sources. Therefore, the release of the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), a 
current longitudinal data set, motivated this paper. Social differences could be an explanation for 
the higher rates of failure among women-owned firms, and social gaps between genders seem to 
be diminishing as time passes (women are becoming a more significant part of the labor and 
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entrepreneurship market). For these reasons, I believe that the effects of social differences could 
be diminished in newer data sets. I also have found the empirical methodology in the literature to 
be inconsistent. Namely, some papers74 only use a gender dummy variable in the study. Others 
papers 75  are content to compare women-owned firms’ survival to those owned by men by 
dividing the data sets and comparing coefficients. Finally, some papers76 have used interaction 
variables. I will make use of the data at my disposal to find whether economic factors can explain 
failure rate differences between genders. A proxy for owner’s confidence (combining the 
sociological and psychological) is added as well. 
My study will make use of two empirical methods to conduct a more complete survival 
analysis. I first compare the hazard rates of the firms by using a Cox model. The first empirical 
method allows me to analyze each variable effect within each subsample and determine whether 
there are different marginal effects associated with each subgroup. I find that size has a larger 
negative marginal effect on women-owned firms’ failure. Taking into account that women’s 
management styles more often consider employees’ satisfaction 77  to be important, that 
satisfaction motivates employees, and assuming that employees’ satisfaction increases the 
marginal product of labor, the results seem reasonable. The first empirical method used for the 
survival analysis also reveals that confidence in holding a competitive advantage is more 
beneficial to the survival of firms owned by men.  
The second empirical model allows interactive gender variables to be added. I ran 
consecutive regressions after stacking variables, along with their interactive pairs. Only when the 
competitive advantage variable is added does the gender variable become insignificant. The 
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75 Boden and Nucci (2000). 
 
76 Carter, et al (1997). 
 
77 Sheppard (1992). 
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model’s results point out that differences in social and psychological variables play an important 
role in explaining women-owned firms’ higher failure rates. Overall, the full model is unable to 
fully explain why women-owned firms are associated with higher failure rates. 
The paper is organized as follows: I first provide the reader with a review of the literature 
on how gender differences affect firms’ survival. This review will concentrate mostly, but not 
exclusively, on the variables I use herein. I then give a brief overview of the KFS and provide 
some descriptive analyses for some of the variables. The third section provides the empirical 
models and corresponding results. The first model is the gender comparison survival analysis, 
which precedes the main survival analysis with successive regressions that clarifies women-
owned firms’ higher chances of failure. Finally, I conclude the paper with a review of the findings 
and suggestions for future research.  
3.2 The Literature Review 
The literature on firms’ success or the survival prospects of firms is extensive. However, 
only a small part of it is dedicated to gender differences. As society evolves, it has become more 
evident that there was a need for more research as women started to gain strength in the business 
environment. Women, as entrepreneurs, have been a growing part of the new creators of small 
businesses in America, although men are still more likely to be self-employed (Kalleberg and 
Leicht 1991). Therefore, it is important to understand what factors influence women for business 
success and survival. There is research that has concentrated on studying women-owned 
businesses’ performance in terms of growth, revenue, profit, and other business success measures. 
This branch has reported that women-owned firms tend to perform worse than men-owned 
businesses (Aldrich 1989; Cuba, DeCenzo, and Anish 1983; Du Rietz and Henrekson 2000; 
Anna, Chandler, Jansen and Mero 1999). Another branch concentrated on survival. Nevertheless, 
there is an important link between both branches of the literature given that one is a consequence 
of the other.  
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It is reasonable to assume that a business fails because of its performance78. Therefore, 
most of the variables studied in either branch are often found in the other branch of the literature. 
There are few agreements among researchers. To be more accurate, there is little we can assert 
with confidence. After considering the reasons that could explain this lack of harmony among 
studies, I first describe what we know, or what we agree most upon, before discussing the 
different theories that explain the differences in survival rates between women-owned and men-
owned businesses. 
Carter, et al. (1997) assert that the lack of empirical findings that would corroborate each 
other had been attributed to “inadequate research design” and “varying assumptions” by 
researchers. For example the definition of failure is still not agreed upon among studies. Some 
researchers define failure as entrepreneurs not being able to reach the goals they set for their 
companies at startup 79 . Over-optimism is a well-known characteristic among entrepreneurs 
(Cassar and Craig 2009). Others have defined failure as a firm’s discontinuation or the business 
being sold or bankrupt (Watson and Everett 1993).  
Among the previous studies there seems to be an agreement among researchers on a 
higher failure rate experienced by women-owned businesses. Most research found that women-
owned businesses are more likely to fail.  
Bates (1995) studied the survival rates of newly started firms and franchises in the retail 
industry using the 1987 Characteristics of Business Owners dataset. Bates (1995) confirmed that 
firms owned by men were more likely to survive. Some studies were not able to find reasons for 
the higher likelihood of failure of women-owned firms. Kalleberg and Leicht’s (1991) coefficient 
for gender was insignificant within the general sample regression. This finding was echoed in Lee 
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79 Headd (2003). 
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and Zhang’s working paper. Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon and Woo (1994) found that women-owned 
firms were just as likely to survive, but were less likely to grow than men-owned firms.  
Many researchers have investigated women’s higher business failure rate by analyzing 
differences between men and women. For instance, Watson (2003) controlled for industry 
because previous research found evidence that women tend to be over-represented in certain 
specific industries such as retail and service industries. Kalleberg and Leicht (1991) referred to 
this as the “female ghetto”. Brush and Chaganti (1999) affirmed that the retail and service 
industries tend to be at the bottom of the value chain, which tends to imply lower returns. Their 
results confirmed previous studies such as Rosa, Carter and Hamilton (1996), which argued that 
some of the differences between men and women-owned firms lie in the fact that women have a 
tendency to start businesses in low-return industries. Hutchinson, Hutchinson and Newcomers 
(1938) noted that industries with lower capital requirements tend to have a higher failure rate 
because of lower barriers to entry that increase competition (Brüderl, Preisendörfer and Ziegler 
1992). Furthermore, the fact that women use less financial capital on average (Coleman and Robb 
2009) (the reasons for this are discussed later) completes a formula for increased failure rates.  
However, it is not known if women have a preference for the industries cited above because of 
their lower financial capital requirements (Brush and Chaganti, 1999) or whether women prefer 
these industries because they fit their management styles. 
The age of businesses has also been linked to women’s higher failure rates. Some have 
argued that women-owned firms are younger on average than men-owned firms and that, because 
younger firms are more likely to fail (Evans 1987), age could thus be a variable negatively linked 
to women-owned firms’ survival ability (Rosa, et al. 1996; Carter, et al. 1997).  
The survival literature has consistently agreed that a firm’s size is an important 
contributor to survival (Mata and Portugal 1994; Geroski, et al. 2010). The bigger a firm is at 
startup, the more it has access to financial markets. Financial institutions may interpret a larger 
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firm as reflecting the entrepreneur’s confidence in the project and are therefore more likely to 
invest. Women-owned firms have a tendency to be smaller, on average (Charboneau 1981; 
Humphreys and McClung 1981; Coleman 2002; Robb and Wolken 2002; Fairlie and Robb 2009). 
It is hard to say why; the possibilities are numerous. As mentioned previously, it could be because 
a majority of women start their businesses from home, which puts an upper limit on the number 
of employees they can hire. It could also be that women have less access to financial markets. 
Consequently, women have more constraints on liquidity than men, and have a lower capacity for 
hiring employees80, which makes it harder to raise future financial capital.  
Another possibility is that women’s management style is a better fit for smaller groups. 
While studying a small sample of women, Sheppard (1992) reported that women portrayed their 
management style as being based on maintaining good relationships and being people oriented. 
She affirmed that women have a strong propensity for basing their decision making on personal 
relations. 
Human capital is usually described as the owners’ own attributes, acquired through self-
investment. Easier-to-measure proxies of human capital have often been measures of experience 
and education. It has been reported that the more specific to an industry previously acquired 
experience is, the higher the likelihood of survival (Thompson 2005; Van de Ven, Hudson and 
Schroeder 1984).  Theoretically, many factors possibly affecting women-owned firms’ higher 
failure rates could be endogenous results of differences in human capital between men and 
women. The differences could be at any level of the many spectrums of experience. Running a 
business as an entrepreneur can be associated with many differing levels of experience, and the 
question of whether the previous years of experience were acquired in the same or an identical 
industry has been shown to be deterministic of survival. Taking into account experience acquired 
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while starting a business rather than that of acquiring an older business that has already overcome 
the challenges of earlier stages of growth is also a major step towards understanding startup 
survival. Cromie and Birley (1991) reported that women’s previous experience was less likely to 
have been acquired while starting a business. Carter, et al. (1997) found, however, that men 
seemed to be using the experience acquired from starting previous companies to improve their 
survival chances. On the other hand, the lack of startup experience for women did not affect 
survival chances differently. Simply said, women with previous startup experience did not use 
this advantage to increase survival probability. Boden and Nucci (2000) hypothesize that women, 
on average, acquire less human capital because of differences in the labor market. Boden and 
Nucci believe that differences in the labor market (women have historically held lower wage jobs 
than men) explain why women’s accumulated experience and financial capital stock is less than 
men’s.  
Education is another measure of human capital that has been widely used in the literature. 
Honing-Haftel and Martin (1986) report differences among women and men in the areas they 
seek education in. Women seem to be more attracted to studies in liberal arts, while men are more 
likely to seek education in technical disciplines81. Education in liberal arts is less likely to yield 
advantages in skills, such as management, finance and development of new technologies, all part 
of the daily tasks of an entrepreneur. Orban (2001) reported the results of a survey she conducted 
on women and men in which she asked entrepreneurs to self-evaluate their competencies in 
different fields. Women who owned firms with employees in the range of 1 to 499, believed 
themselves to have deficiencies in financial skills. For firms in the range of 10 to 499 employees, 
women still believed they had lower financial skills than their men counterparts. Men consistently 
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evaluated themselves above women’s self-evaluations for managerial skills 82  as well. 
Interestingly, women in the range of 1 to 499 employees evaluated themselves above men’s self-
evaluation for technical skills. The question is not really whether women are less educated than 
men83, but rather how do they educate themselves?  
Family commitment and the ability to devote enough time to business is an aspect 
differentiating women and men (Fasci and Valdez 1998). Women have reported challenges in 
balancing their time between home duties and time to dedicate to their businesses. Assuming that 
a firm’s survival is a positive function of time invested into the business (Boden and Nucci 2000), 
women-owned firms are therefore more likely to fail (Fasci and Valdez 1998; Birley 1989). 
Women are attracted to the idea of operating their businesses from home. It allows them to take 
care of their families and run their businesses. Boden and Nucci (2000) used a dummy variable 
for home-based businesses on two samples of the Characteristics of Business Owners survey 
(1982 and 1987). They reported that businesses operating from home were less likely to use 
financial capital at startup and therefore were less likely to survive. One reason is that home-
operated businesses have an upper limit in size, which in turn could be a negative signal sent to 
financial institutions that will result in lower financial capital availability.  
Among the greatest debate found in the literature is the question of whether or not 
women are discriminated against in the financial markets (Coleman and Robb 2009). The 
question was raised because women usually mention that they face some discriminatory treatment 
when they apply for loans with financial institutions. However, I was not able to find any study 
that could present results to defend this argument. It is true that women use less capital than men 
both at startup and in the early stages of a company’s life. Coleman and Robb (2009) studied the 
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83 Mahot (1997) reported than in the E.U. countries, women’s education was equivalent to or even higher 
than men’s. 
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KFS and found that the women in the sample started their firms with significantly less financial 
capital than men, and that women also tend to raise less capital in the second and third years of 
the firm’s life. Their results remained significant even after controlling for the usual measures of 
human capital. However, whether this is an effect of the supply (the financial institutions’ 
selection process) or of the demand side (entrepreneurs’ application for financing) of financial 
markets is harder to say. They found evidence that financial institutions tend to invest more in 
firms with specific characteristics such as hours spent in the business, prior startup experience 
and being classified as an organization; these characteristics are not usually associated with 
women-owned businesses. They also found that women relied more heavily on personal sources 
of debt and equity, while other research has found women to be more risk averse84 than men, 
leading them to start smaller and more manageable businesses. This would indicate that women 
themselves are reluctant to apply for external debt and equity. Other papers have indicated that 
the lower amount of capital raised by women was the results of differences in human capital and 
the variations could be explained by differences in experience and education between the genders. 
Tigges and Green (1994) suggested that women’s lower levels of experience and lower amounts 
of equity invested into their businesses might explain women’s reduced access to capital markets.  
Boden and Nucci’s (2000) paper and results are very interesting, as they may show the 
roots of the financial capital difficulties. Assuming that women's wages in the labor market are 
actually lower than men’s, and that past wages constitute the main source of startup capital, 
Boden and Nucci found that survival was indeed positively related to startup capital85. The 
negative effects of the demand side consist of women being less likely to apply for loans, 
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suggested that women may be more risk averse (Cliff 1998; Orser and Hogarth-Scott 2002). 
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although they are not more likely to be turned down. A couple of studies confirmed demand-side 
effects on the financial markets (Coleman 2002; Cole and Mehran 2009; Treichel and Scott 
2006). This is a puzzle, as women insist on encountering barriers to secure loans in a study by 
Constantinidis, Cornet and Asandei (2006), yet when the authors separated the firms by growth 
potential, they found that women with higher growth-potential firms encountered less barriers. I 
would like to add that the only reference to discrimination in the financial markets I was able to 
find in the literature was reported mostly by surveys that would describe women’s feelings. 
Women's lower use of financial institutions' services were, usually, the results of other factors 
that are characteristic of women-owned firms, whether it was human capital, the industry, 
motivation, or any other factor besides gender. No matter what the causes were, women are more 
concerned with access to capital than any other problem in managing their businesses (Orser, 
Hogarth-Scott and Riding, 2000).  
Women may be less concerned with financial rewards that men are (Rosa, et al. 1994; 
Brush 1992), and thus women may pursue a different level of satisfaction when they start a 
business. Brush (1992) indicated that women thought of their business more as a “cooperative 
network of relationships” than a “profit-making entity.” Nonetheless, Orban (2001) found that 
women and men classified their motivations more or less in the same order but weighed them 
differently. For instance, in Orban’s sample, independence and self-accomplishment were ranked 
first in both groups of men and women, but women indicated that prestige attributes, such as 
social status and power, had a lower value to them as compared to men. These differences in 
motivation lead to differences in management styles as well. Sheppard (1992) reported that 
women believed their management style was less cost oriented, with an accent on persuasion and 
personal relations86. My study will not address these latest issues given that the KFS does not 
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provide information on management style or preferences. There are other differences reported in 
the literature87, but it is my belief that the ones reported herein provide a good basis for the 
reader’s general understanding of the question. 
3.3 The KFS and Descriptive Statistics 
 
• The Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) 
 
The KFS is a random sample of 4,928 businesses taken from an initial pool of 32,429 
firms from the Dun and Bradstreet (DB) database created in 2004. The baseline questionnaire was 
sent in 2004, and follow-up questionnaires were sent every year following that. So far, five 
following waves consisting of data from 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 have been added to 
the baseline. The dataset contains information on a variety of topics, including financing, 
organizational structure and legal status, business characteristics and strategies, owner 
demographics, and work behavior. 
To be part of the KFS sample, a startup could not be a spin-off, a subsidiary of any other 
business, or inherited by previous owners. The sample weights were adjusted accordingly for 
surviving firms that chose not to answer. 
Some firms surveyed could also be firms created to reduce taxes on individuals. It has 
been shown in prior research, both theoretical and empirical (Åstebro and Bernhadt 2003; Gordon 
1998), that paying fewer taxes could be an incentive for individuals to create companies as tax 
shelters, because corporate tax rules are often advantageous compared to income taxes. I expect 
some of the firms surveyed were also created as tax shelters. The way I chose to correct for this 
issue was to drop the firms that reported no sales in all years of activity (33 observations were 
deleted). 
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Table 3.1 
Industry Distribution in the KFS 
 
Industry Names and (Code) 
KFS New 
Employer 
Businesses 
Census 
Employer 
Firm Births 
PSED New 
Businesses 
Professional (54), Management,  
and Educational Services (61) 
16.1 14.1 16.8 
Retail  Trade (44) 15.6 12.0 18.6 
Administrative and Support, and Waste  
Management and Remediation Services (56) 
11.4 6.0 2.1 
Construction (23) 9.8 15.7 10.0 
Other Services (except Public Administration) 
(81) 
8.0 8.5 0.3 
Manufacturing (31) 7.2 3.2 3.5 
Wholesale Trade (42) 6.0 4.5 1.5 
Real Estate, Rental and Leasing (53) 3.7 5.1 5.3 
Finance and Insurance (52) 4.7 2.2 3.1 
Health Care and Social Assistance (62) 4.2 7.7 2.9 
Information (51) 2.6 1.4 4.2 
Transportation and Warehousing (48) 2.9 3.3 2.4 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation (71) 3.1 2.1 3.2 
Accommodation and Food Services (72) 3.9 9.1 10.9 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and hunting (11) 1.4 0.4 2.0 
Mining (21) 0.0 0.3 0.5 
Utilities (22) 0.0 0.1 0.5 
Management of Companies and Enterprises (55) 0.0 0.1 6.7 
Unclassified (99) 0.0 2.2 5.6 
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, Baseline data: Tabulations by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc; and 
Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, from longitudinal data (established with some 
first-quarter payroll) provided by the U.S. Census Bureau; Reynolds, P. 2004. Entrepreneurship in the 
United States Assesment, Miami, Fla: Florida International University. 
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that as compared to the U.S. Census, the distribution of 
firms by industry in the KFS has higher proportions of businesses in certain industries88, such as 
manufacturing, professional management, education, retail and wholesale, and finance and 
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insurance, just to cite a few. However, the KFS has a lower proportion of firms in construction, 
healthcare and social assistance, and accommodations and food services (see Table 3.1). 
• Descriptive statistics 
An objective of the paper is to first check if women-owned firms are indeed more likely 
to fail in the KFS, considering its novelty.  
Each firm in the sample can describe 10 of its owners. If a firm has more than one owner, 
the KFS declares the owner with the most equity invested in the firm to be the main owner. In 
case of equal ownership, the KFS uses the number of hours worked and other characteristics to 
determine the main owner. Therefore, if a firm’s main owner was found to be a woman, this firm 
is classified as women-owned. 26 percent of firms were women-owned at startup in 2004. This 
percentage decreases every year, among surviving firms, before reaching 15 percent in 2009 (see 
Table 3.2). As mentioned in the literature review, studies use different definitions of failure. I 
define discontinuance at time t as a firm that was active in the lagged period, t-1, and if the firm 
has stopped operations temporarily (and does not reappear in any other period) or has declared to 
be permanently out of business, or  has declared to be out of business for any other reason besides 
a change in ownership. 
As demonstrated by the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard graph (see Figure 3.1), women 
do have a higher likelihood of failure. Looking at the Nelson-Aalen graph, we see the difference 
between the men-owned and women-owned curves is increasing in every period. This is an 
indication that the difference in failure rates is increasing every year. 
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Table 3.2  
Summary Statistics for the Whole Sample 
 
2004 2005 2006 
Variables Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd 
Gender 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.41 0.19 0.39 
Size 3.12 4.11 4.25 5.28 4.6 5.68 
Main owner experience 12.69 10.5 13.03 10.58 13.36 10.61 
Mean experience 12.29 9.84 12.62 9.94 12.74 9.88 
Home Operation 0.5 0.5 0.42 0.49 0.38 0.49 
Competitive advantage 0.64 0.48 0.58 0.49 0.51 0.5 
Total debt 73,144 189,792 54,757 163,264 54,480 162,613 
Total equity 59,874 165,486 36,833 138,635 25,705 116,443 
Total equity OO 57,076 151,332 24,170 99,967 16,687 84,872 
Total equity NOO 22,842 120,108 14,951 104,131 10,099 83,126 
Total equity NOO formal 17,145 118,930 12,775 103,911 10,073 99,029 
Total equity NOO non-
formal 3,931 43,806 2,514 36,290 1,332 24,637 
2007 2008 2009 
Variables Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd 
Gender 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.37 0.15 0.36 
Size 4.63 6.31 4.59 6.13 4.52 6.14 
Main owner experience 13.57 10.65 13.94 10.79 14.05 10.66 
Mean experience 12.97 9.95 13.32 10.02 13.54 9.96 
Home Operation 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.47 
Competitive advantage 0.44 0.5 0.4 0.49 0.33 0.47 
Total debt 46,678 150,625 50,395 161,185 44,564 152,451 
Total equity 18,520 99,995 15,847 92,713 14,962 91,706 
Total equity OO 11,827 70,444 11,468 71,519 10,232 67,345 
Total equity NOO 6,945 70,976 5,674 65,772 5,747 67,210 
Total equity NOO formal 6,064 77,876 5,650 74,176 5,720 79,355 
Total equity NOO non-
formal 1,345 23,359 433 9,761 677 16,425 
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, 2011 release. 
Table 3.3 shows the summary statistics for both men and women. I calculate the firm size 
as the total number of employees working for the firm, including the number of operating owners. 
We can see that women-owned firms are smaller on average than men-owned firms. The 
difference in size seems to grow as the firms become older—although there is a big dispersion in 
the distribution as shown by the standard deviations.  
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Figure 3.1 
Nelson-Aalen Cumulative Hazard Graph 
 
 
 
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, 2011 release. 
The owners’ experience is defined by the KFS as the years of experience in the same 
industry the firm competes in89. I link a firm’s experience to the levels reported by the firm’s 
main owner. It seems that the KFS is no exception to previous findings. Women are, on average, 
less experienced when compared to men. 
I then look at home-operated businesses and whether the owners believe they hold a 
competitive advantage over their competition. As expected, women are more likely to operate 
from their homes. What is surprising is that the percentage of women operating from home does 
not decrease as the firms grow older, although the percentage of men operating from home tends 
to go down. We would expect firms—regardless of the owner’s gender—operating from home to 
make up a lower part of the sample as firms start exiting (see Figure 3.2). If home-operated 
                                                            
89 This variable is bounded from above at 40 years. 
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businesses are more likely to exit, then it could be that women tend to move their businesses 
home later in the life of the business90.  
Figure 3.2 
Home-Operated Businesses Comparison between Women- and Men-Owned Firms 
 
 
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, 2011 release. 
I use the competitive advantage dummy to proxy for owner’s confidence. Given this is a 
self-reported variable, I assume91 that owners do not have a clear idea of their advantage over the 
competition in the early stages of the firm’s life. Therefore, an owner who declares having a 
competitive advantage could be exhibiting a sign of confidence92. Surprisingly, the data suggest 
that 68 percent of women-owned firms believe they held a competitive advantage at startup 
compared to only 55 percent of men-owned firms. Overall, women seem to be more confident 
                                                            
90  The results for the probit regressions on home-operated businesses can be found in Appendix 3.1. I find 
that the probability for women to be operating from home increases every year. 
 
91 Jovanovic (1980) suggested that an entrepreneur’s judgment of the venture became clearer as the firm 
grew older. 
 
92 Koellinger, Minniti and Schade (2007) found entrepreneurs to be overconfident by analyzing samples in 
many countries. Forbes (2005) found a negative correlation between overconfidence and survival rates. 
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than men in their competitive advantage in every year of the firm’s existence. There could be 
three explanations. The first one is that these data reflect the reality that women have a better 
competitive advantage than men on average. The second possible explanation is that women 
overvalue their competitive advantage position (optimism), and finally93, the third possibility is 
that men undervalue their competitive advantage (pessimism).  
Table 3.2 gives an overview of the financial variables94 for the whole sample. Debt seems 
to be the preferred way to finance the startups when analyzing the whole sample, if we look at the 
mean, but the standard deviation indicates that there is a big dispersion in the sample distribution.  
Actually, all the financial variables shown in Table 3.2 are very dispersed95, which is why 
I calculate the median96 of these variables. The medians for total debt and total equity are 751 and 
4001, respectively, for 2004. Therefore, 50 percent of the sample used more equity than debt. The 
medians for formal and non-formal sources of equity from non-owners/operators were both zero. 
Therefore, the analysis through the mean can be misrepresenting the data. According to Coleman 
and Robb (2009), findings on gender financing—using the three first waves of the KFS (2004, 
2005, and 2006)—firms owned by men raised more money in the first three years of operations 
when compared to women-owned firms (US $200,000 for men and US $120,000 for women). 
They also found that women use less financial capital to start up their business and raise 
considerably less financial capital than men in the following years (at least for 2005 and 2006) of 
operations. Both women and men prefer internal to external sources of funds.  
 
                                                            
93 Forbes (2005) found an negative correlation between overconfidence and survival rates. 
 
94 Note that the variables “total debt” (and “total equity”) are the total amount of debt (equity) owed by the 
firm at time t. It is both the amount of outstanding and new debt (equity) the firm used to finance its 
operations. 
 
95 The distribution of the financial variables is asymmetrical and positively skewed, as shown by the 
financial variables’ detailed summary statistics in Appendix3.2. 
 
96 Not shown here. 
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Table 3.3 
Summary Statistics Comparison between Genders 
 
2006 2007 
Women-owned Men-owned Women-owned Men-owned 
Variables Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd 
Size 3.51 4.86 4.97 6.65 3.52 4.74 4.91 6.46 
Main owner experience 9.81 9.31 14.8 10.77 10.56 9.77 15.04 10.87 
Mean experience 10.16 8.83 13.91 10.13 10.73 9.11 14.2 10.17 
Home Operation 0.53 0.5 0.3 0.46 0.54 0.5 0.3 0.46 
Competitive advantage 0.61 0.49 0.4 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.36 0.48 
Total debt 45,294 143,786 46,961 152,006 58,909 175,650 48,777 158,265
Total equity 15,614 83,178 19,115 103,098 13,509 80,071 16,292 94,930 
Total equity OO 9,776 52,732 12,247 73,543 9,785 61,617 11,788 73,254 
Total equity NOO 6,034 65,247 7,132 72,100 3,278 47,021 6,129 68,756 
Total equity NOO 
formal 3,459 55,940 6,597 81,636 3,010 50,380 6,151 77,876 
Total equity NOO non-
formal 1,176 21,450 1,380 23,734 464 5,155 427 10,409 
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, 2011 release. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004 2005 
Women-owned Men-owned Women-owned Men-owned 
Variables Mean Sd. Mean Sd Mean Sd. Mean Sd. 
Size 3.41 4.39 4.54 5.52 3.55 4.26 4.93 6.03 
Main owner experience 9.53 9.27 14.25 10.73 9.68 9.2 14.59 10.76 
Mean experience 9.63 8.72 13.66 10.13 9.86 8.72 13.7 10.06 
Home Operation 0.52 0.5 0.39 0.49 0.54 0.5 0.34 0.47 
Competitive advantage 0.68 0.47 0.55 0.5 0.66 0.47 0.48 0.5 
Total debt 42,250 138,373 58,282 169,471 47,257 145,007 56,175 166,450
Total equity 20,452 90,600 41,449 149,094 18,802 91,654 27,326 121,486
Total equity OO 13,573 61,174 27,156 108,241 11,547 58,531 17,894 89,907 
Total equity NOO 6,423 63,921 17,354 112,796 6,831 65,459 10,866 86,744 
Total equity NOO 
formal 4,404 61,559 15,134 112,911 5,493 72,470 11,148 104,267
Total equity NOO non-
formal 2,593 34,910 2,492 36,675 1,364 19,976 1,325 25,610 
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Table 3.3 Continued 
 
2008 2009 
Women-owned Men-owned Women-owned Men-owned 
Variables Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd 
Size 3.51 4.83 4.81 6.45 3.51 4.83 4.81 6.45 
Main owner experience 10.7 9.58 15.12 10.77 10.7 9.58 15.12 10.77 
Mean experience 10.97 9.02 14.36 10.11 10.97 9.02 14.36 10.11 
Home Operation 0.53 0.5 0.29 0.46 0.53 0.5 0.29 0.46 
Competitive advantage 0.48 0.5 0.31 0.46 0.48 0.5 0.31 0.46 
Total debt 46,159 145,121 44,278 153,747 46,159 145,121 44,278 153,747
Total equity 11,050 74,331 15,661 94,471 11,050 74,331 15,661 94,471 
Total equity OO 6,864 42,569 10,835 70,857 6,864 42,569 10,835 70,857 
Total equity NOO 4,443 61,421 5,980 68,201 4,443 61,421 5,980 68,201 
Total equity NOO 
formal 6,326 98,984 5,612 75,327 6,326 98,984 5,612 75,327 
Total equity NOO non-
formal 229 2,222 757 17,808 229 2,222 757 17,808 
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, 2011 release. 
Finally, Tables 4 and 5 show the industry choice for women- and men-owned firms. As 
expected, we can see that a high percentage of women locate in the “retail trade” industry, with 
15.4 percent (NAICS 44 and 45) of women-owned firms at startup in 2004. Surprisingly, the 
“professional, scientific, and technical services” industry did better, with 21.84 percent of 
women-owned firms starting in 2004. “Other services” is third, with 11.68 percent of women 
choosing it for their firms in 2004. Lastly, “manufacturing” was another preferred industry for 
women, with 10.79 percent. Excluding “professional, scientific, and technical services”97 from 
the analysis, men seemed to be more present in the “manufacturing” and “construction” 
industries. “Other services” is only the fourth industry where men choose to operate. Tables 3.4 
and 3.5 clearly show a difference in genders’ industrial distribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
97 As stated previously, the KFS oversampled firms in NAICS 54. 
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Table 3.4 
Women-Owned Firms’ Industry Distribution 
 
    2004 2007 2009 
NAICS Industry description N % N % N % 
11 Agriculture, forestry, fishing and   
hunting 
9 0.73 5 0.73 3 0.56 
21 Mining 1 0.08 0 - 1 0.19 
23 Construction 55 4.43 36 5.26 25 4.69 
31 Manufacturing 23 1.85 13 1.9 11 2.06 
32 Manufacturing 42 3.38 30 4.39 14 2.63 
33 Manufacturing 69 5.56 42 6.14 26 4.88 
42 Wholesale trade 55 4.43 23 3.36 20 3.75 
44 Retail trade 83 6.69 41 5.99 28 5.25 
45 Retail trade 108 8.7 50 7.31 40 7.5 
48 Transportation and warehousing 21 1.69 10 1.46 8 1.5 
49 Transportation and warehousing 1 0.08 1 0.15 0 - 
51 Information 28 2.26 13 1.9 12 2.25 
52 Finance and Insurance 32 2.58 18 2.63 18 3.38 
53 Real Estate and Rental  and 
Leasing 
47 3.79 28 4.09 21 3.94 
54 Professional, Scientific and Tech 
serv 
271 21.84 165 24.12 132 24.77 
55 Management of companies and 
enterprises 
2 0.16 0 - 0 - 
56 Adm and support and waste 
management and remediation 
90 7.25 49 7.16 38 7.13 
61 Educational Services 13 1.05 7 1.02 6 1.13 
62 Health Care and Social Assist 68 5.48 43 6.29 36 6.75 
71 Arts, entertainment and recreation 52 4.19 29 4.24 25 4.69 
72 Accommodation and food services 26 2.1 9 1.32 9 1.69 
81 Other Services (except Public 
adm) 
145 11.68 72 10.53 60 11.26 
Total   1241 100 684 100 533 100 
Source: Tabulation of the Kauffman Firm Survey, 2011 release. 
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Table 3.5 
Men-Owned Firms’ Industry Distribution 
 
2004 2007 2009 
NAICS Industry description N % N % N % 
11 Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 28 0.79 29 0.83 26 0.91 
21 Mining 4 0.11 4 0.12 4 0.14 
22 Utilities 6 0.17 7 0.2 7 0.25 
23 Construction 323 9.09 321 9.24 276 9.66 
31 Manufacturing 27 0.76 36 1.04 38 1.33 
32 Manufacturing 105 2.96 91 2.62 83 2.91 
33 Manufacturing 431 12.13 360 10.36 299 10.47 
42 Wholesale trade 160 4.5 177 5.09 146 5.11 
44 Retail trade 197 5.55 198 5.7 144 5.04 
45 Retail trade 131 3.69 150 4.32 114 3.99 
48 Transportation and warehousing 76 2.14 72 2.07 57 2 
49 Transportation and warehousing 9 0.25 6 0.17 6 0.21 
51 Information 131 3.69 119 3.42 95 3.33 
52 Finance and Insurance 150 4.22 140 4.03 91 3.19 
53 Real Estate and Rental  and Leasing 127 3.58 135 3.88 106 3.71 
54 Professional, Scientific and Tech serv 891 25.08 875 25.18 748 26.18 
55 Management of companies and enterprises 7 0.2 5 0.14 5 0.18 
56 Adm, support, waste management and remediation 258 7.26 249 7.17 205 7.18 
61 Educational Services 16 0.45 24 0.69 17 0.6 
62 Health Care and Social Assist 51 1.44 65 1.87 60 2.1 
71 Arts, entertainment and recreation 52 1.46 61 1.76 48 1.68 
72 Accommodation and food services 71 2 57 1.64 46 1.61 
81 Other Services (except Public adm) 298 8.39 292 8.4 233 8.16 
 92 Public Administration 3 0.08 2 0.06 3 0.11 
Total 3552 100 3475 100 2857 100 
Source: Tabulation of the Kauffman Firm Survey, 2011 release. 
 
3.4 The Empirics 
• Survival analysis 
I use a Cox proportional hazard model throughout the entire survival analysis. Industry 
fixed effects are controlled for throughout the survival analysis. 
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• A comparison of the women- and men-owned firms subsample 
I first follow the empirical techniques set in some studies such as Boden and Nucci 
(2000) and compare the survival prospects of women- and men-owned firms on the different 
variables.  
It has been explained throughout this paper that size is an important contributor to 
survival. The literature has shown a difference in firms’ size, on average, between women- and 
men-owned firms. Theoretically, I do not see a reason why the marginal increase of one 
employee would be more beneficial for one gender’s firm’s survival over the other if the external 
effects—such as the link between size and debt—are controlled. Whether or not this is true 
remains an empirical issue. The second variable worth investigating is the effect of being a home-
operated business. I do expect that a business operated from home is more likely to fail than a 
business operated from an office. However, whether or not one particular gender is more 
penalized by operating from home is unclear. On the one hand, women are more likely to self-
select to work from home to take care of domestic tasks. Thus, if women are spending some 
working hours on domestic tasks, it is reasonable to assume they are spending fewer hours on 
their firms. On the other hand, men are less likely to self-select working from home and therefore 
less likely to spend their working hours on domestic tasks. Therefore, a man’s choice to operate 
his business from home is most likely the result of higher liquidity constraints98.  
The financial sources a firm uses differ, on average, by gender. Literature has reported 
that women are less likely to file requests for loans from financial institutions (Coleman and 
Robb 2009). As Lee and Zhang did in their working paper, I differentiated the models by 
breaking down the sources of equity. 
 
                                                            
98 According to Evans and Jovanovic (1989), one’s propensity to be self-employed—and his/her success—
is positively related to the entrepreneur’s wealth. 
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I ran three models that can generally be written, at time (t), as: 
ehh tCAjteriencejtfinancejtHomejtsizejt CAExperienceFinanceHomeSizettj )(0 exp0)()( εββββββ ++++++= , 
where ௝݄  represents the hazard faced by subject j and ݄଴  represents the baseline hazard that 
everyone faces within the gender group. The variable size is the total number of employees in the 
firm j. The variable “home” is equal to one (home=1) if the firm is operated from home. The 
vector “finance” contains total debt and total equity used by j. The difference between the three 
models relies on this last variable. The first model, M1, uses total debt and total equity values 
while the other two models break down equity. The M2 model differentiates total equity between 
owners-operators’ and non-owners operators’ equity. The M3 model differentiates non-owners-
operators’ equity from formal and informal sources. “Experience” is a proxy of human capital 
that consists of the primary owner’s experience in the industry. Finally, “CA” (competitive 
advantage) is a variable that proxies for owner’s confidence. Competitive advantage is equal to 
one (CA=1) if the respondent believed the firm holds a competitive advantage over its 
competition. 
The results are presented in Table 3.6. Perhaps the most surprising result is that the 
marginal effect of one employee is slightly more beneficial to women for survival (the difference 
in coefficients is smaller than the standard errors). The same analysis can be done for one year of 
“experience”. The results on “size” may be the caused99 by women's style of leadership that 
stresses the importance of a good relationship with their employees and a management style that 
accentuates their employees’ motivation (Sheppard 1992). The belief of holding a competitive 
advantage has a higher negative effect on failure for men. The results associated with men-owned 
firms belief in holding a competitive advantage could be because men are more conservative 
                                                            
99 Further research is needed in order to find the reasons for this result. 
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when estimating their competitive advantage or that men better understand how to use their 
competitive advantage. Regarding the financial variables, overall, holding any kind of equity 
increases failure rates (only the coefficient on non-owners-operators- non-formal equity on the 
men-owned subsample is significant.); while holding debt seems to decrease failure rates (none of 
the coefficients on debt is significant). These results echo Lee and Zhang’s findings. Finally, 
operating a business increases failure rates in both subsamples, although the women subsample 
has slightly lower coefficients for “home-operated”. 
• The survival analysis for women’s hazard rate 
 
In this section, I seek a reason that could explain why women-owned firms are more 
likely to exit. The empirical model makes use of interactive variables that would represent the 
variables’ effects on women-owned firms. The variable of interest is “gender” which represents 
women-owned-firms (gender=1 if the firm is owned by a woman). The basic model B0 seeks to 
confirm that women are indeed more likely to exit.  
Once this is established, I run successive models successively adding variables. Each 
additional model is contingent on whether I have found the “gender” variable to be significant in 
the previous model. First, among the most likely contenders to explain women-owned firms' 
higher likelihood of exit, I expect the firm’s size to matter; also, women have a higher tendency 
to run their businesses from home, which could also be a possible cause for women's higher 
failure rates, as these two variables have a very large difference between women- and men-owned 
firms. If none of these variables succeeds in explaining the gender coefficient, I add the financial 
vector that includes “total debt” and “total equity.” The next option is to add the main owner’s 
experience and its squared value to control for the non-monotonic trait of the experience function. 
The last added control is “competitive advantage,” which is the closest proxy the KFS provides 
that can be used for sociological and psychological differences between women and men.    
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The model can generally be expressed as follows at time any time (t): 
ehh tgxjtjtXjtgenderjt GenderXXGenderttj ))((0 0)()( εββββ +×+++ ×= , 
 where “gender” represents a vector of dummies equal to one if the firm is owned by a woman 
(gender=1 if j is woman-owned). X j  represents the vector for the control variables100 discussed 
above, and )( GenderX jj ×  represents the vector of interactive variables. Note that the 
coefficients in β X  should be the ones from the corresponding variables on men-owned firms, 
while β gX ×  represents the difference between the women- and men-owned coefficients in the 
subsample survival analysis. The results are presented in Table 3.7.  
The B0 model confirms that women-owned firms are indeed more likely to fail, as the 
coefficient on gender is positive and statistically significant. The next model adds the firm’s size 
and an interactive variable for women-owned firms’ size. As expected, the coefficient on firms’ 
size confirms that size decreases the men-owned firms’ hazard rate. However, the coefficient on 
the size*gender indicates that the difference between women and men is not statistically 
significant in the model. Moreover, the coefficient on gender is still positive and significant. 
Therefore, I conclude that the difference in size among women- and men-owned firms cannot 
explain the difference in survival rates within genders. M2 adds the home-operated business 
dummy and its interactive variable. The results suggest that a home-based firm increases a men-
owned firm’s hazard rate, as the coefficient on home is positive and significant. The surprising 
result is that the higher trend for women to operate their businesses from home does not explain 
their higher failure rates. The coefficient on gender remains significant—and positive—while the 
coefficient on home*gender is insignificant. The results found on total debt and the corresponding 
interactive variable are insignificant, and I deduce that they, too, cannot explain the women-
                                                            
100 Chi-squared tests were conducted on the different variables, and the results are presented in Appendix 
3.3. 
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owned firms' higher likelihood of failure. The coefficient on the equity interactive variable is 
insignificant, implying that this variable also fails to explain the reasons behind women-owned 
firms' higher failure rates.  
Adding experience (and experience squared) in M3 does not change the behavior of the 
model. The coefficient on gender remains significant and increases again. So far, the coefficient 
on gender increased from 0.132 to 0.302 while controlling for size, home-operation, use of debt 
and equity and experience. Taking into account the results reported in Table 3.6, this is not 
surprising. Women have better coefficients (for survival) in the variables used so far. Thus, it is 
expected that controlling for these variables increases the coefficient on gender. Intuitively, 
however, these results indicate that the negative effect on a firm’s survival probability for being 
women-owned is increasing when the controls cited previously are added to the model.  
The last model, M4, adds the competitive-advantage dummy variable. The coefficient on 
gender becomes insignificant. The point estimate on gender drops from 0.302 to 0.194 (from M3 
to M4) and increases overall from 0.132 to 0.194 (from B0 to M4). Unfortunately, the increase 
from B0 to M4 is smaller in magnitude than the standard errors, and therefore both coefficients 
can be considered similar. Therefore, the last model was also unable to explain women’s higher 
failure rates on the firms’ survival.  
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Table 3.6 
Survival Analysis with Gender Subsamples 
 
 M1 M2 M3 
VARIABLES Women-
owned 
Men-owned Women-
owned 
Men-owned Women-
owned 
Men-owned 
       
Size -0.0704*** -0.0568*** -0.0739*** -0.0605*** -0.0740*** -0.0593*** 
 (0.0263) (0.0130) (0.0269) (0.0133) (0.0270) (0.0132) 
Home-operated 0.270** 0.371*** 0.285** 0.377*** 0.286** 0.381*** 
 (0.129) (0.0858) (0.129) (0.0858) (0.130) (0.0859) 
Total debt -0.00449 0.0200 -0.0224 0.0122 -0.0243 0.0121 
 (0.0452) (0.0237) (0.0471) (0.0238) (0.0477) (0.0240) 
Total equity -0.206 -0.120**     
 (0.174) (0.0573)     
Total equity owners-operators    -0.0244 -0.0877* -0.0252 -0.0895* 
   (0.0937) (0.0504) (0.0931) (0.0499) 
Total equity non owners-operators    0.0105 0.0516   
   (0.123) (0.0448)   
Total equity non owners-operators, non-formal      0.0547 0.184*** 
     (0.177) (0.0670) 
Total equity non owners-operators, formal      0.0225 0.0102 
     (0.132) (0.0459) 
Experience -0.0580*** -0.0441*** -0.0575*** -0.0441*** -0.0574*** -0.0439*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0118) (0.0197) (0.0118) (0.0197) (0.0118) 
Experience squared 0.00148** 0.000937*** 0.00146** 0.000939*** 0.00146** 0.000937*** 
 (0.000648) (0.000327) (0.000651) (0.000327) (0.000651) (0.000327) 
Competitive advantage -0.270** -0.487*** -0.269** -0.494*** -0.269** -0.497*** 
 (0.115) (0.0780) (0.115) (0.0780) (0.115) (0.0782) 
Observations 4,255 12,528 4,257 12,539 4,257 12,539 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.7 
Survival Analysis for the Gender Effect using Interaction Variables 
 
VARIABLES B0 M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 
Gender 0.132** 0.228** 0.269* 0.282* 0.302* 0.194 
 (0.0656) (0.102) (0.146) (0.147) (0.182) (0.188) 
Size  -0.0870*** -0.0675*** -0.0652*** -0.0614*** -0.0554*** 
  (0.0132) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0132) (0.0128) 
Gender * Size  -0.0101 -0.0129 -0.00898 -0.0162 -0.0183 
  (0.0306) (0.0293) (0.0288) (0.0296) (0.0292) 
Home-operated   0.396*** 0.383*** 0.396*** 0.367*** 
   (0.0827) (0.0835) (0.0853) (0.0853) 
Home-operated * Gender   -0.0735 -0.0791 -0.123 -0.119 
   (0.145) (0.146) (0.147) (0.146) 
Total debt    0.0284 0.0228 0.0235 
    (0.0230) (0.0238) (0.0237) 
Total debt * Gender    -0.0324 -0.0356 -0.0324 
    (0.0504) (0.0509) (0.0506) 
Total equity    -0.113** -0.131** -0.120** 
    (0.0522) (0.0582) (0.0568) 
Total equity * Gender    -0.0971 -0.0820 -0.0918 
    (0.186) (0.188) (0.184) 
Experience     -0.0474*** -0.0445*** 
     (0.0117) (0.0117) 
Experience squared     0.00102*** 0.000950*** 
     (0.000326) (0.000325) 
Experience * Gender     -0.0123 -0.0143 
     (0.0224) (0.0223) 
Experience squared *Gender     0.000446 0.000504 
     (0.000724) (0.000718) 
Competitive adv      -0.491*** 
      (0.0777) 
Competitive adv * Gender      0.239* 
      (0.138) 
Observations 20,607 17,188 17,188 17,174 16,783 16,783 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
This study updates the literature on the effects of gender differences on firms’ survival 
rates. Using the KFS, a recent dataset that surveyed firms founded in 2004, I confirm the 
literature findings that women-owned firms are more likely to fail. By separating the sample into 
two subsamples of women- and men-owned firms, I compare the effects of previously studied 
variables, such as firms’ size, human capital, financial capital use, and home-operated businesses 
on survival. I add a variable never used previously, as far as I know: self-reported competitive 
advantage, which proxies for owners’ confidence.  
The summary statistics also showed that the percentage of women operating from home 
was not decreasing as firms were aging, as opposed to men-owned firms. Moreover, the 
percentage of women operating from home increased from 2004 to 2005. Considering that 
operating from home is found to increase the hazard rate, I assume that this increase in home-
operated businesses was due to a flow of women-owned firms from a professional work 
environment back to their home (maybe because they started a family). More research is needed 
to determine whether this proposition is correct. 
The model, which analyses both genders' subsamples, has been used before in the 
literature. The results indicate that a marginal employee hired by a women-owned firm had a 
greater contribution to survival than one marginal employee on men-owned firms. More research 
towards genders’ different styles of management should be conducted to determine whether this 
result was the product of greater employee motivation associated with women’s style of 
management.  
A marginal year of experience for the main owner in the industry the firm is competing in 
had a similar contribution for each gender (although it was slightly higher for women), indicating 
that experience is used similarly across genders. Thus, assuming that experience does play a role 
in explaining genders’ differences in failure rates, it must be that it is the difference in experience 
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levels that penalizes women-owned firms. Indeed, women are less experienced on average. The 
genders-separated survival analysis also shows that women-owned firms’ self-reported belief in 
holding a competitive advantage was a lower contributor for survival than it was for men-owned 
firms. The summary statistics showed that women-owned firms, on average, thought more often 
than men that they held a competitive advantage. The higher proportion of women-owned firms 
to believe they held a competitive advantage is a hint that women-owned firms may be 
overconfident (or men are more careful) in claiming they have a competitive advantage, which, 
considering Koellinger, et al. (2007), should increase women-owned firms’ failure rates. The 
results could also indicate that men better utilize their competitive advantage. I also find that 
operating a business from home increases the hazard rate for both men and women. More 
research is needed to assert with certainty which of the reasons stated previously is the most 
plausible.  
After confirming that women-owned firms are more likely to fail, I seek a reason using a 
new survival model. With the use of gender-interactive variables, I investigate whether the 
differences in the coefficients across genders found in the first survival model are important 
enough to force women-owned firms to fail more frequently. I find that the difference in 
coefficients for variables previously thought to be the reasons behind women-owned firms’ 
higher likelihood of failure were insignificant within the KFS.  
Variables such as size, home-operated businesses, financing and experience were not 
enough to explain the coefficient on gender. I added “competitive advantage” in the last model. 
The difference in the gender coefficients on competitive advantage was significant, while gender 
became insignificant. The coefficient on gender decreased from the previous model (M3) while 
increasing from the base model (B0). Before me, Carter et al. (1997) had found that differences in 
management styles were very important in analyzing genders firms’ survival. 
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Despite findings that contribute to the literature by confirming that differences in 
sociological and psychological factors across genders are part of the explanation for women-
owned firms’ higher failure rates, this study was not able to explain the entire gender effect on 
firms’ survival.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Appendix 1.1 
Regressions results with the firm’s total number of employees variable including the 
firm’s number of owner-operators. The first and second columns show the results of the first year 
survival probability using 2004 conditions. The third and fourth columns show the results of the 
probability of survival in the last year of the survey (2007) using founding conditions. The results 
are pretty straightforward. Including the firm’s owner-operators to the number of employees for a 
measure of size do not change anything in the regressions whether it be on current conditions or 
on founding conditions (See Appendix 1.1 below for results).  
 
Appendix 1.2 
 Regressions results using two measures of industry scale like Åstebro and Bernhardt 
(2003) show that the second measure of scale (percentage of firms in the two digit sic industry 
employing fewer than 50 employees) is not useful in my study. The second measure of scale is 
found to be insignificant in the current conditions regression and both measure of scale are found 
to be insignificant in the founding conditions regression (see Appendix 1.2 below for results). 
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Appendix 1.1 
Regressions Adding the Firm’s Owner-operators to the Number of   Employees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Model M3 in first 
year 
M3 in first 
year 
Founding 
conditions 
using M3 
Founding 
conditions 
using M3 
  
Model 
including 
owner-
operators in 
total number 
of employees 
Model 
excluding 
owner-
operators in 
total 
number of 
employees 
Model 
including 
owner-
operators in 
total 
number of 
employees 
Model 
excluding 
owner-
operators in 
total number 
of employees 
Control Variables in 2004 Probability 
of Survival 
in year 2005 
Probability 
of Survival 
in year 
2005 
Probability 
of Survival 
in year 
2007 
Probability of 
Survival in 
year 2007 
Total number of employees  _ 0.027 _ 0.018 
without owners operator (2.40)** (2.78)*** 
Total number of employees  0.025 _ 0.019 _ 
with owners operator (2.42)** (3.02)***   
Relevance of experience 0.029 0.03 0.034 0.034 
  (3.06)*** (3.10)*** (5.01)*** (5.06)*** 
Quadratic of  the relevance  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
of experience (2.49)** (2.54)** (3.91)*** (3.98)*** 
Leverage between 0 and 1 0.169 0.166 0.028 0.028 
  (1.93)* (1.90)* (0.49) (0.48) 
Leverage equal to 1 0.028 0.028 0.01 0.012 
  (0.3) (0.29) (0.15) (0.18) 
Leverage greater than 1 -0.15 -0.153 -0.239 -0.24 
  (1.45) (1.47) (3.18)*** (3.19)*** 
Leverage is infinite -0.2 -0.203 -0.203 -0.205 
  (2.08)** (2.11)** (2.84)*** (2.87)*** 
Portion in the industry with 1.958 1.949 1.096 1.069 
fewer than 20 employees (2.99)*** (2.98)*** (2.32)** (2.26)** 
Constant -0.36 -0.318 -0.331 -0.281 
  (0.62) (0.55) (0.79) (0.67) 
Observations 4366 4366 4366 4366 
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Appendix 1.2 
Regressions for Comparison using Åstebro and Bernhardt (2003) two Measures of Scale 
 
Model M3 on first year Åstebro and 
Bernhardt 
(2003): on first 
year 
M3 on founding 
conditions 
Åstebro and 
Bernhardt 
(2003) on 
founding 
conditions 
Control Variables in 2004 Probability of 
Survival in 
year 2005 
using one 
measure of 
industry scale 
(M3) 
Probability of 
Survival in 
year 2005 
using two 
measures of 
industry scale 
in M3 
Probability of 
Survival in 
year 2007 
using one 
measure of 
industry scale 
(M3) 
Probability of 
Survival in 
year 2007 
using two 
measures of 
industry scale 
in M3 
Total number of employees 0.027 0.028 0.018 0.019 
  (2.40)** (2.48)** (2.78)*** (2.77)*** 
Relevance of experience 0.03 0.029 0.034 0.034 
  (3.10)*** (3.06)*** (5.06)*** (5.05)*** 
Quadratic of  the relevance  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
of experience (2.54)** (2.50)** (3.98)*** (3.96)*** 
Leverage between 0 and 1 0.166 0.168 0.028 0.028 
  (1.90)* (1.92)* (0.48) (0.48) 
Leverage equal to 1 0.028 0.032 0.012 0.013 
  (0.29) (0.33) (0.18) (0.19) 
Leverage greater than 1 -0.153 -0.149 -0.24 -0.239 
  (1.47) (1.43) (3.19)*** (3.18)*** 
Leverage is infinite -0.203 -0.203 -0.205 -0.205 
  (2.11)** (2.12)** (2.87)*** (2.87)*** 
Portion in the industry with 
fewer than 20 employees 1.949 3.028 1.069 1.201 
  (2.98)*** (1.97)** (2.26)** -1.04 
Portion in the industry with  _ -2.484 _ -0.299 
fewer than 50 employees (0.77) (0.12) 
Constant -0.318 1.101 -0.281 -0.112 
  (0.55) (0.57) (0.67) (0.08) 
Observations 4366 4366 4366 4366 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Appendix 1.3 
Linear Regressions of Size 
 
Total number of 
2005 2006 2007 
employees  
Relevance of  0.041 0.115 0.114 
experience (2.36)** (4.56)*** (3.92)*** 
Quadratic of  the  -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
relevance of experience (1.54) (3.20)*** (3.13)*** 
Leverage between 0 and 1 0.79 1.174 1.291 
(5.50)*** (6.19)*** (5.94)*** 
Leverage equal to 1 2.122 1.733 2.145 
(12.85)*** (6.86)*** (7.50)*** 
Leverage greater than 1 0.584 0.28 -0.295 
(2.91)*** -0.9 -0.81 
Leverage is infinite -0.081 0.119 -0.164 
(0.43) (0.36) (0.43) 
Constant 0.791 1.28 1.551 
(5.60)*** (6.52)*** (6.79)*** 
Observations 4582 3664 3092 
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Appendix 2.1: Chi-Square Test Results 
A Wald test is used for each variable after a full model was run. The tests have two 
degrees of freedom because they compare three coefficients for each variable. 
 
Appendix 2.1.1: ܪ଴;	  The effect of the variable on each group is the same. The 
coefficients between SPs, PPs and PBs are not significantly different. For each variable in the 
vector x: ߚ	ௌ௉ ൌ ߚ	௉௉ ൌ ߚ	௉஻ (See Appendix 2.1.1 below). 
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Appendix 2.1.1 
Variables chi2(  2) Prob > chi2 
Capital per worker 11.3 0.0035** 
Expenses per worker 0.71 0.3997* 
Owners’ experience 1.28 0.5273* 
Size 7.82 0.0200** 
Assets 9 0.0111** 
Industry wage 2.01 0.3654* 
* The null hypothesis ܪ଴ cannot be rejected. 
** The null hypothesis ܪ଴ is rejected 
 
Appendix 2.1.2: ܪ଴;	 The coefficients for SPs are PPs are significantly equal to 0. For each 
variable in the vector x: ߚ	ௌ௉ ൌ ߚ	௉௉ ൌ 0 (See Appendix 2.1.2 below). 
Appendix 2.1.2 
Variables chi2(  2) Prob > chi2 
Capital per worker 16.28 0.0003** 
Expenses per worker 6.18 0.0456** 
Owners’ experience 5.46 0.0652** 
Size 24.23 0.0000** 
Assets 7.76 0.0207** 
Industry wage 1.69 0.4304* 
* The null hypothesis ܪ଴ cannot be rejected. 
** The null hypothesis ܪ଴ is rejected 
 
Appendix 3 
Appendix 3.2 
 Probit Regressions on Gender for Firms Operating From Home. 
 
VARIABLES 
T=2005 T=2006 T=2007 T=2008 T=2009 
Home-
operated 
Home-
operated 
Home-
operated 
Home-
operated 
Home-
operated 
Gender T-1 0.0927** 0.306*** 0.552*** 0.646*** 0.707*** 
 -0.0417 -0.0451 -0.0489 -0.0527 -0.0559 
Constant -0.285*** -0.473*** -0.667*** -0.738*** -0.804*** 
 -0.0213 -0.0212 -0.0216 -0.0216 -0.0218 
Observations 4,789 4,789 4,789 4,789 4,789 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The probit regression above clearly shows that being women-owned increases every year—
coefficients are positive and significant—the probability of being home-operated every year. 
Appendix 3.1 
 Summary Statistics Details for Financial Variables. 
 
Women -Owned Total debt 
2004 
Total equity 
2004 
Total equity OO 
2004 
Total equity NOO 
2004 
Obs 1237 1234 1237 1237 
Mean 54301.08 37105.59 38528.27 12873.97 
Std. Dev. 155150.3 117102.3 114847.8 83119.24 
Skewness 3.314858 4.249769 4.315237 7.516754 
Kurtosis 13.3611 20.44443 21.18427 63.28097 
 
Appendix 3.1 Continued 
Men -Owned Total debt 
2004 
Total equity 
2004 
Total equity OO 
2004 
Total equity NOO 
2004 
Obs 3552 3540 3552 3552 
Mean 79840.29 68135.54 63690.61 26433.73 
Std. Dev. 200220.4 179050.3 161806.3 130710 
Skewness 2.840198 3.261514 3.340379 5.669601 
Kurtosis 10.47714 13.39233 13.95409 36.36728 
 
Appendix 3.3: Chi- Squared Tests. 
 
ܪ଴:	 The effect of the variable on each group is the same. The coefficients between men and 
(women-men) are statistically similar. 
ߚ	௫ ൌ ߚ	௫∗௚ 
Variables chi2(  1) Prob > chi2 
Size 1.01 0.31* 
Home-operated 4.24 0.0396** 
Total debt 0.83 0.3632* 
Total equity 0.05 0.8249* 
Experience 1.21 0.2718* 
Competitive Advantage 13.36 0.0003** 
* The null hypothesis ܪ଴ cannot be rejected. 
** The null hypothesis ܪ଴ is rejected. 
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